

THE PHANTOM CORPS

McNamara, James C.

History of III (Phantom) corps ...



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We Live Through Their Efforts

To the combat soldiers who fought so bravely from Bastogne to Bavaria — to those heroic men whose courage never failed, who suffered, who sacrificed, who died on the battlefields of Europe — this story is humbly dedicated.

HEADQUARTERS III CORPS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
CAMP POLK, LOUISIANA

15 October 1945

The purpose of this booklet is to give to the officers and men of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, a short history in words, pictures and sketches of their III Corps, which they may take home to their families and friends—and, in the years to come, to re-read, live again, and perchance to dream. A roster of the personnel with addresses as known today, a map and two large charts are included.

We are indebted principally to Captain James C. McNamara for much of the written story, its style and manner of presentation. Captain Charles F. Watkins and Colonel Norman B. Edwards, both of the G-3 Section, Colonel F. Russel Lyons, Corps Engineer, and Headquarters Corps Artillery have contributed some parts. All sections of Corps have helped with material. The excellent sketches, charts and pictures have been assembled by the able artists of Corps Headquarters. The general staff has done its usual fine job of supervision and our able and smiling Chief, Colonel James H. Phillips has provided much of the vision, scope and coordination.

The III Corps was made famous by its seizure of the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine at Remagen. It was called the Phantom Corps by surprisingly showing up at many critical places. The Corps became great by winning extraordinary victories. The greatness of a unit comes only with a full understanding of men and by an ability to take advantage of opportunities.

I take no credit for organizing, training and leading this Corps prior to 17 March 1945. On that day I inherited a Corps which I found in every action to be well trained, experienced and highly capable. Most of all, it was friendly, harmonious, cheerful, mature, understanding and helpful without lessening in the least its force and determination in battle. It was my honor and pleasure to be at the head of this splendid team in the closing months of the war when opportunities came, great victories were won and outstanding successes achieved. Let me pay tribute to the former commanders—Generals Wilson, Stilwell, Bull, Lucas and Millikin, whose high standards and hard work in those early days paid off. And also let us be thankful for the great and inspiring leadership of Generals Simpson, Hodges and Patton, in whose armies the III Corps moved ahead.

The officers and men who make up this team are a grand lot, all seasoned veterans of the greatest army in history. It is with sadness that I see them leave to take up new pursuits. When I forget one, a little more of me is gone. We have together lived perhaps our greatest life following the colors of the III Corps through privation, hardships, danger and sacrifice to final victory.

To all of you—my many thanks and all good wishes.

James A. Van Fleet
JAMES A. VAN FLEET,
Major General, Commanding.



History of the III (Phantom) Corps--World War II

Metz

FIRST BLOOD

BLISTERED black by the unrelenting fire of American guns, Fort Jeanne D'Arc lay silent in the squalor of her own destruction, awaiting the dictates of her conquerors on the cold gray morning of December 13, 1944. At her sides were piled the warped steel and broken cement that signified defeat.

At 0900 her commanding officer, grim-faced young Major Hans Voss, indicated that his cause was lost. He contacted headquarters of the 101st Infantry, 26th division, a containing unit of the III



Corps, and wearily asked for a truce. By 1115 the negotiations were completed, and slowly, like tired animals emerging from the earth, the Nazi columns shuffled through the battered doors of the garrison and surrendered to the American troops. The Nazi personnel—511 officers and enlisted men—stood listlessly by while their commander quietly answered the questions of Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness and Colonel Walter T. Scott of the 26th Division. Artillery, mortars, bombing, loudspeaker heckling, and small arms fire had taken a toll. The fort had become a tomb. Food and ammunition had been exhausted. The German desire to fight had dissolved in empty stomachs and barren shell cases.

Fort Jeanne D'Arc was the last of the Metz fortifications to fall and in her demise was born a new III Corps—a battle baptized unit prepared to fight anew under World War I combat colors of Aisne - Marne, Meuse - Argonne, Oise - Aisne and Champagne.

Ready for whatever the future had in store, the Corps stood on the threshold of what later proved to be one of the great chapters of the war—the German offensive in the frozen Ardennes. Commanded by Major General John Millikin, and ably staffed by Chief of Staff Colonel James H. Phillips; Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Henry E. San-

derson; G-1 Colonel Robert L. Christian; G-2 Colonel Bernard J. Horner; G-3 Colonel Harry C. Mewshaw; G-4 Colonel Remington Orsinger; and G-5 Colonel Charles H. Andrews, the unit was to achieve fame as "The Phantom Corps"—an organization destined to haunt the enemy from Metz to the Austrian Border.


RETROSPECT

There are really two courses of history to follow in the combat story of the III Corps—the lightning drive of the headquarters elements on the Western Front, and the slugging assault of the Corps Artillery which at first was divorced from the headquarters group.

The story of the adventures of the Corps Artillery will be quoted from time to time in chronological relation to the headquarters activity. Their coverage begins in the month of September, 1944.

"On September 12, 1944, the III Corps Artillery sailed from New York aboard the British Transport "Rangitata," and after a 12-day uneventful voyage (enlivened by only one genuine alert when German reconnaissance planes circled the huge convoy) arrived at Liverpool, England.

"The traditional 'English drizzle' put in an untimely appearance as we disembarked and all hands were thoroughly drenched enroute to the railroad



station. Within 24 hours of landing on English soil we walked up another gang plank, this time to board the "HMS Cheshire" at Southampton. After several false starts and amid welter of rumor and conjecture about enemy submarines, the vessel negotiated the 'Manche' (as we later learned the French called the channel) and the storied shores of France

hove into view. Some 24 hours later in an LCT loaded to the gunwales, we embarked on a circuitous voyage in the dark which ultimately concluded on continental soil. In one month the Corps Artillery had jumped 6,200 miles, from Presidio of Monterey, California, to Omaha Beach, France.

"Colonel Thomas W. Watlington, Executive, and Major Peter Wells, Jr., of Corps I. G. staff, were on hand to meet the unit. After an eye-opening ride across the Normandy peninsula, over which the tide of battle had only recently rolled, the Artillery reached its first CP—Carteret, a quiet charming village, from which, in peacetime, excursion boats plied their leisurely way to the nearby islands of Guernsey and Jersey.

"The following thirty days, spent in these idyllic surroundings, were devoted chiefly to care and cleaning of equipment, study of maps, CPX exercises and supervision of newly landed artillery units. But the honeymoon couldn't last forever. In one stroke the war became a reality.

"From the battle zone, to which Artillery Commander Brigadier General Paul V. Kane had already proceeded, came the call for his unit to join the forces of General George S. Patton's Third U. S. Army. Under the direction of Colonel Vonna 'Butcher' Burger, Assistant Artillery Commander, the unit departed Cartaret on October 27 and made the road march in three days, bivouacking the first night at a crossroads called Sainte-Anne. The second night was spent in barracks formerly used by the Germans in the cathedral city of Rheims, and on the third day the convoy arrived at its destination in the town of Onville, the artillery's initial CP on the banks of the Moselle.

THE BIG GUNS SPEAK

"Preparations for the Phantom's first strike were made October 31—Halloween night—when the big guns were trundled into position along the banks of the Moselle River in the vicinity of Metz. On the following day the unit relieved the 33rd FA Brigade by verbal instructions from XX Corps, and set out to function as an auxiliary fire direction center.

"Our fire missions were to be laid on the twin forts—North and South Verdun—and on Fort Driant. Plans formulated by the fire direction center were designed to keep those gun-turreted bastions under strict surveillance. We were to provide immediate counter-battery fire when they opened up.

"Rumors of an impending attack materialized into reality and on November 8 this headquarters participated in a preparation to support the attack of the adjacent XII Corps. Counter-battery was delivered to neutralize enemy artillery fire, and interdiction missions were assigned to harass enemy personnel. On subsequent days this headquarters scheduled and delivered fires to support the attack of the 5th Infantry Division. With the assault going well, further concentrations and TOT's were fired to support the advance of the 6th Armored Division.

"On November 11, the Headquarters forward echelon crossed the Moselle River and opened the next day at Bouzieres where the fire-direction center went underground for the first time, occupying a musty and catacomb-looking cellar next to the village church. The village population had fled or been evacuated. From this location the Artillery continued to support the squeeze on the fast shrinking defenders of Metz. Excellent OP's were available and much of the FDC personnel was able to glimpse smoke-shrouded Metz before that stronghold fell. Unit liaison planes made frequent reconnaissance flights along the front lines, and as the enemy began to flee the city, our headquarters directed intense fires on principal roads leading east from Metz.

"On November 29, the fire-direction center opened in the city hall of Bouzonville, the hub of the road net immediately west of the German city of Saarlautern, and occupied by rear elements of the enemy as recently as November 23. Intensive harassing and interdiction fires supplemented aerial bombardment, after which doughboys of the 95th Infantry Division forced a crossing of the Saar River at Saarlautern, capturing a bridge intact.

"It was at 1930 hours December 9 when this headquarters received its first baptism of fire. At that hour the CP was shaken by an explosion, the magnitude of which led personnel to believe that



26th Division soldiers preparing to raise American flag over Ft. Jeanne D'Arc.



26th Division officers question captured commander of Ft. Jeanne D'Arc.

the city was being bombed. Investigation revealed that the community was being fired on by an artillery piece whose shells left gaping holes measuring 15 feet deep and 30 feet across in the ground. In all, 15 rounds fell during the night, one of which killed two civilians in a cellar. The enemy gun, later determined by an analysis of fragments to be a 380mm (roughly 14 inch) RR gun, fired from such an extreme range that persevering efforts to locate it by flash and sound methods were unavailing. Inquiry indicated that this was the largest calibre gun used by the enemy on the Western Front up to that time.

"Throughout the unit's tenure at Bouzonville, Corps Artillery steadily whittled down the enemy's guns with intensive counter-battery fire, and disorganized the enemy's personnel, communications, and supplies with heavy TOT's and concentrations.

"On December 16, after a 19 day stay at Bouzonville, III Corps Artillery was relieved from at-

tachment to XX Corps, and reverted to III Corps with the closing of the CP at 1700 hours."

"If anyone were guilty of dreaming of a rest, those dreams were rudely shattered when word was received that far to the north the enemy had smashed our lines with almost a dozen divisions and was making formidable headway. Orders were received at 2230 hours on December 18 for the unit to prepare for immediate movement on Corps Order. Leaving its artillery battalions to a group commander, the Artillery set out on a long road march north, grim in the knowledge that it was heading for the hottest kind of action and probably its severest test to date.

"On December 20, the headquarters moved in bitterly cold weather to Virton, Belgium, where a temporary CP was set up in a parochial school building. The next day the unit moved to Arlon, Belgium, where preparations were made to attack."

Battle of the Bulge

ALL OR NOTHING

The background of the Bastogne action dated back to the assault on Paris. When the French Capitol fell to the allied blows in late August, the German armies committed to the Western Front reeled backward under the terrific impact of the driving American and British forces. Repeatedly the Nazis made token stands, but their defensive reactions were nothing more than the desperate efforts of a badly punched fighter momentarily trapped on the ropes. In Metz the German rallied, then broke again and vainly sought a shell in which he could recoup his resources.

The press of the world, through thousands of editorial voices, began to trumpet the collapse of the House of Hitler. The Moselle had been crossed. Only the winding waters of the Saar lay between the rampaging American forces and the traditional barrier of the Rhine. Once the Rhine was reached the Reich was finished. There was no further hope for a Nazi stand. The world was walking the transient rainbow to reap the riches of wishful thinking.

It was true the foundations of the Reich were cracking, but similarly true was the fact that the wily German High Command was still a reckoning power. With a frenzy born of desperation the Nazis struck.

In Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt the German High Command placed the fate of the Reich. And in savagery of assault Von Rundstedt placed his hopes of success. Employing large concentrations of panzers and infantry, on the morning of December 16 the Nazis blew a hole in the American offensive crust in a drive directed north and west into the upper reaches of Luxembourg, and toward the vast Allied supply dumps at Brussels and Liege. In a 43-hour slashing attack the Germans powered their way some forty miles to a new line running north and south through Malmedy and St. Vith in Belgium, and Wiltz in Luxembourg.

The German impetus of advance was geared to a tremendous pace as the Nazi troops tried hard to capitalize on the element of surprise. Three days after the offensive had kicked off, Von Rundstedt's forces—on the night of December 19—had pushed their advance in the north as far as Stavelot, 25 miles west of the German frontier, while farther south they had surrounded Bastogne and reached St. Hubert. And thus was set the stage for what later became known as the "Phantom" operations of the III Corps.

ENTER THE PHANTOM

An overcast sky, merging on the horizon with the snow covered terrain, shrouded the movement of white camouflaged vehicles as they swung quickly to the critical points of action in the stunned villages of Luxembourg and Belgium. Early on the morning of December 19 the forward echelon of III Corps Headquarters closed its CP at Metz, moved swiftly to Luxembourg City, and thence on the fol-

lowing day to Arlon. The staff's mission was to design a quick counter-offensive action to be launched against the southern flank of the German penetration, the "Under Belly" of the Bulge.


It was the Allied fighter now who felt the press of the ropes at his back. He had been hammered hard by the desperate German, and the fury of assault had left him groggy and somewhat confused. But still he was capable of retaliation.

American lines of communication had been severed at several points and information concerning the situation, the enemy, and friendly troops was anything but adequate. It was known that the 101st Airborne Division, together with elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, were surrounded in Bastogne; that two regiments of the 106th Division were surrounded at Ober Laschied, and that scattered groups of the enemy were to the immediate northwest of Arlon. When the Corps CP moved to Arlon there were only a few scattered railroad engineers between the CP and the enemy. The situation was officially described as "fluid."

With the utmost speed and secrecy, the III Corps marshalled its forces for the counter-assault needed to tip the plunging Nazis off their aggressive balance. The 26th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division began concentrating in the vicinity of Arlon. The 80th Division closed in at a point near Luxembourg. There wasn't a moment to spare. Third Army's directive was to relieve Bastogne and to "attack in direction of St. Vith." The III Corps staff immediately made plans to accomplish this directive. There was no thought of throwing up a defensive bulwark. Passive action would not slow down the Hitler marauders. Every American was called upon to attack!

The power punch of the Corps called for a





jab to the Nazis' flank, with the 80th Division on the right, the 26th in the center, and the 4th Armored whip on the left. Jumping off at 0600 on the frosty fog-bound morning of December 22, the two infantry units momentarily caught the enemy napping, scored early rapid advances, and paused at nightfall to consolidate their positions for an early morning resumption of the attack. The 80th Division had swept five miles into the German flank before dusk settled down over the snow-carpeted Ardennes. On the west side of the III Corps salient, the rough riders of the 4th Armored Division's CC "A" had jockeyed their way fourteen miles to the village of Martelange before being halted by a blown bridge.

With the mounting of this attack the III Corps became for a time the only major unit on the Western Front to seize and hold the initiative at a time when the enemy had made deep penetrations into the First Army front, and was threatening to make good his breakthrough.

Recovering from the initial surprise, Nazi troops braced and for the succeeding 48 hours launched a series of local counter-attacks which slowed down the progress of the III Corps forces. But by Christmas morning, with distant village church bells pealing their message of prayerful hope, the 26th Division had reached the frozen banks of the Sure River, 12 miles southeast of Bastogne. Meanwhile the 6th Cavalry Group (Task Force Fickett) had been assigned to the III Corps. The Group, minus the 6th Cavalry Squadron, was given a mission on

the Corps' west flank, and the 6th Cavalry Squadron, was given a zone between the 26th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions. On the afternoon of Christmas Day, Corps Headquarters was advised that the 80th Division would continue in position but would pass to control of the adjacent XII Corps. In lieu of the 80th, the III Corps was to receive the 35th Infantry Division, and on December 27 that division passed through and relieved the 6th Cavalry Squadron.


Meanwhile the 26th Infantry Division continued its advance and pushed across the Sure. On the day after Christmas elements of Combat Command "R," 4th Armored Division, led by Lt. Col. Creighton Abrams, slashed a narrow corridor flanked on both sides by heavy enemy fire, to make the initial contact with the beleaguered 101st Airborne Division and relieve the siege of Bastogne. Despite the magnificent job which the Air Corps did in supplying by air the embattled garrison, there was still an acute need for certain supplies, which were requested by the defenders. Consequently, under cover of darkness, tanks escorted forty Corps trucks, loaded with needed medical supplies, ammunition and food, to the now famous "Nuts to the Nazis" defenders of Bastogne. On the same night, Corps transportation evacuated wounded and PW's from the town. With this action of liberation, Bastogne became a "III Corps City."

Slowly, relentlessly, the III Corps was grinding to rubble the foundations of new German hopes. Much blood was on the snow—American blood. But

the stains were blotting out the terrorizing imprint of the Prussian boot.

For purposes of power and enemy mystification, General George S. Patton—crafty, cunning in the ways of combat, a will o' the wisp to the Nazi Intelligence—juggled his fighting forces in the Bastogne Bulge so that it was virtually impossible for Von Rundstedt to decide whom he was meeting where.

New Year's Eve, 1945, proved a significant day in the history of III Corps, when Headquarters personnel had a close brush with disaster. Headquarters was subjected to intermittent bombing attacks for a period of almost 24 hours. Shortly after midnight "Bedcheck Charlie"—Corps' regular nocturnal marauder—succeeding in dropping a 500 pound bomb through the roof of the Normal school building housing the CP—luckily the bomb was a dud.



New Year's Eve for the enemy was even more significant to him. Looking back from the threshold of the new year, he saw the shattered remnants of his once proud hopes. During the 10 days of the major German effort prior to January 1st, the Corps losses amounted to a total of 3,330 killed, wounded and missing, of whom 303 were fatalities. The gambling enemy, who could ill afford any serious depletions in any section of his front, had lost 4,730 men in captured alone. In addition to the PW count there were an estimated 4,000 Germans killed and more than 23,000 wounded.

RAIN OF STEEL

Meanwhile Corps Artillery was also exchanging

punches with the enemy. Combat organization at the time included the 238th FOB and the 203rd FA Group, with temporary control of the 402nd FA Group—normally a part of the VIII Corps—landing added power.

Both the Corps and Corps Artillery CP's had experienced their first taste of aerial bombardment on the night of December 23rd when several unidentified planes had dropped a stick of bombs near the local railroad station, starting a large fire which could be seen from the shattered windows of the CP. Belatedly the Luftwaffe was attempting to regain the initiative from the power-packed American lineup.

The III Corps Artillery was hammering targets at a machine-gun pitch. Missions were fired in support of the 26th and 80th Divisions, for the 4th Armored Division, and for the 101st Airborne Division which was in beleaguered Bastogne. As the old year faded out the big guns fired on no less than six counter-attacks.

"Enemy air continued to be active," relate the Artillery historians, and hardly a night passed when "Bed-Check Charlie" didn't buzz the Corps Artillery area, sometimes on reconnaissance and sometimes dropping a bomb or two. On one occasion when considerable friendly armor was passing a crossroads adjacent to the CP, unidentified aircraft dropped a stick of explosives, some of which landed some 50 feet from the CP, knocking plaster from the walls and jarring several members of the staff.

"Liaison was established with the 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne by Captain Elmer E. Hilgedick and later by Major Thomas W. Campbell, at a time when the only avenue of approach to that city was under constant attack, and when the community itself was under frequent aerial and artillery fire.

"On January 6 the 183rd FA Group was attached to this headquarters, and preparations were made and executed in support of the Corps attack. The attack progressed against strong resistance and reports indicated heavy enemy casualties caused by our counter-battery, harassing, and interdiction fires."

WINTER WARFARE

Locked in the grip of winter, the snow-mantled Ardennes—the "Little Alps" of Luxembourg—were destined to go down in history as the theatre of the war's most explosive drama, with the III Corps playing a major role. In its first 10-days, Corps troops liberated more than 100 towns; secured the vital road center of Bastogne; created a counter bulge in the Nazi's southern flank; and reduced enemy pressure at a critical point in the campaign.

The German High Command hadn't anticipated the heroic reaction of the American officer and G. I. to intense combat under vicious weather conditions. The Wehrmacht Intelligence had undoubtedly been dubious of the doughboy's capacity to stand up against the combined hardships of combat and a winter almost Arctic in nature. But as the men of Valley Forge once had pushed on in blood soaked tracks behind the great leadership of their com-



Men of 35th Division fire against German dive-bombers near Bastogne.

26th Division infantry moving up near Wiltz, Luxembourg.

Graves of Germans killed by Corps artillery at Wiltz, Luxembourg.

Arlon-Bastogne highway, January, 1945.

View of Bastogne after German bombing and shelling.

Evacuating wounded with sled by 35th Division Medics.



Battery of Corps Artillery "Long Toms" in action.

mander, so once again did the ranks of the "decadent democracies" call on dormant powers of endurance.

The first week of January found Von Rundstedt making fanatical bids to crack the American shell tightening on his do-or-die efforts. But the Phantom Corps shifted swiftly with each enemy prodding, and launched chain-lightning counter-attacks that sufficed to wear thin the edges of the once razor sharp salient.

It was on a morning alive with wind-driven snow that Fate introduced the III Corps to her future commanding officer. From the wreckage of the Siegfried town of Dillingen on the German side of the bridgeless Saar, the 90th Division was secretly withdrawn for the push in the Bulge, and at the helm of the Texas-Oklahoma unit was Major General James A. Van Fleet, later to be in command of the III Corps.

With the arrival of the 90th, Corps planned the reduction of an enemy pocket in the vicinity of Harlange, approximately 10 miles southeast of Bastogne. The Corps was flush with the power of three crack infantry units—the 26th, the 35th, and the 90th. It had the mobility of the 6th Armored Division (which had recently replaced the 4th Armored Division), Task Force Fickett (6th Cav Gp reinforced), and the supporting artillery of the VIII and XII Corps. Flying in its support were planes of the seasoned XIX TAC.

At 1000 on January 9 the attack jumped off with the 90th Division, whose presence was still unknown to the enemy, making the "main effort." The tactical plan of Major General Millikin and the Corps staff was brilliantly conceived and ably executed. The initial results are best described in the Corps "After Action Report" which reads as follows:

"At 1000 the carefully planned attack jumped off, and on both flanks met with success. The 90th Infantry Division, attacking on a 3500 yard front with three battalions abreast, by mid-afternoon had taken BERLE. By sundown it had advanced to the right of and beyond that town to a point approximately 1500 yards southeast of DONCOLS, which lay astride the only East-West highway remaining open to the Germans, and which offered his primary escape route to the East.

"By nightfall it had become evident that the enemy on the east flank either had been caught by surprise or had been unable to cope with the powerful drive of the 90th Division. His resistance there had been heavy, consisting of German armor as well as mortar, artillery, and Nebelwefer fire. He was nevertheless powerless to stop the assault and was steadily pushed to the North."

On January 15, prior to the assault on the town of NEIDERWAMPACH, a TOT barrage of 17 battalions was fired by Corps Artillery which enabled a battalion of the 90th Division to take an initial prisoner bag of 270 men while suffering only 2 casualties. The artillery then played a vital role in breaking up five enemy counter-attacks. Whenever weather permitted, liaison aircraft patrolled the front lines locating ripe targets and adjusting the subsequent fire.

"Corps Artillery" quoting its history—"fired a heavy counterbattery program in support of a XII Corps attack on January 13 and a long-range interdiction program at the direction of Third Army. The enemy was reported attempting to withdraw his armor from the rapidly diminishing "Bulge" and Corps Artillery maintained a steady drum-fire on possible routes of escape.

"Communication personnel, hampered by snow, wind, and cold were at work continuously maintaining communications during the period.

"On January 23 while enroute to a new CP location at Schimplach, Luxembourg, headquarters personnel were able to witness the grim destruction wrought by the Corps Artillery. Torn and mutilated German bodies, dead horses, shattered field pieces, demolished buildings, wrecked vehicles, and scattered supplies were everywhere to be seen."

EXIT VON RUNSTEDT

Now it was that Von Rundstedt found himself in a position of peril in which it became increasingly obvious that he must either withdraw or suffer annihilation of his forces. He had poked his finger into the lion's mouth and the jaws were commencing to shut. By degrees his flanks were being compressed from the north by the First Army and from the south by the III Corps, while the VIII Corps



Victim of artillery shell-fire, frozen Nazi body.

was blocking from the West. The sands of time were running out and his escape gap to the Siegfried cement was growing smaller and smaller.

The Germans tried desperately to anchor their lines—to prepare new springboards for rejuvenated thrusts, but the III Corps and its neighbors continued to spar. The 6th Cavalry Group had advanced swiftly to the northeast to grab Tarchamps. The 90th Division's 359th Infantry, under the cloak of darkness, had virtually walked through the sleeping ranks of the unsuspecting enemy to capture a vital crossroad east of Doncols. The 6th Armored Division had rolled 1500 yards to the vicinity of Wardin. The 35th Infantry Division had powered its way forward for a gain of a mile.

Von Rundstedt might well have been fighting an octopus with devastating tentacles.

The Nazi dragon who had set forth so boldly from his Siegfried lair to prey upon the lands of Belgium and Luxembourg was limping for home—but not without serious wounds. As far back as 12 January the German defenses had turned to ashes. More than 2,000 prisoners had been captured in 48 hours, and they had brought with them partially verified stories of friction between the Wehrmacht and the vaunted "SS."

Throughout the Battle of the Bulge the Corps had been opposed by the Nazis best. From 23 December through 7 January elements of no less than 10 German divisions were identified daily in front of the Phantom. January 5 was a typical day with the 5th Parachute Division—the 9th, 26th, 167th and 340th Infantry Divisions—the 130th Panzer Grenadier Division, 2nd Panzer Division and the much vaunted 1st SS, 9th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions together with the Fuehrer's Brigade, Engineer Brigade and an Assault Gun Brigade being identified.

It is impossible to praise too highly the brilliant aerial work of the XIX TAC during the operations in the Bulge. With unseasonable blue skies affording excellent observation, the XIX TAC, over a period of five days—December 23 to December 27—flew a total of 282 missions, which embraced 2,346 sorties. Spreading terrorizing devastation from the heavens, the Third Army's supporting aircraft destroyed or damaged 341 tanks (or other



Corps Artillery CP, Schimpach, Luxembourg.

armored vehicles) ; 2,450 motor transports; 243 gun positions; 88 enemy planes; and attacked 123 German garrisoned towns.

The XIX TAC paid a price of 49 planes lost. But the Air Corps efforts—coordinated tightly with smashing ground power, assisted effectively in wiping the Bulge from the face of the earth.

As January drew to a close it was evident that the Nazi grip had been broken in the Ardennes. Von Rundstedt's remnants confined themselves to fighting delaying actions while the crack SS troops scurried to the protection of the Siegfried.

The German High Command had paid a terrible price for the gamble which had failed to "jackpot." Wehrmacht dead were stacked like proverbial cordwood in every portion of the III Corps zone. A total of 7,205 Nazi prisoners had been herded into Corps PW cages, and in equipment alone in the III Corps area the ill-fated German mission had cost the Reich 135 tanks; 96 artillery pieces; and 229 vehicles of all types—this in addition to the impressive Air Corps bag.

The Yanks had beaten both the enemy and the elements. During the bulk of the operations temperatures had hovered at a zero level; blinding snow and fog had limited observation; waist high snowbanks had turned advancing infantry into automatons of slow motion; icy roads had made vehicular travel tedious and hazardous. But neither German fire nor the caprice of winter had sufficed to handcuff the Americans in the Battle of the Bulge.

Memories

The Luxembourgers are proud of a fine stretch of highway called the "Skyline Drive" which runs north out of the capital city along a high ridge paralleling the Siegfried Line. Heavy military traffic, sporadic shelling, and foul weather had combined to destroy parts of the great vehicular artery, but untiring efforts by engineer crews kept the road open most of the time.

It was along this general line that the III Corps paused briefly for a second wind before launching an assault on the imposing fortifications of the Siegfried. The highway, appropriately named, snaked its way over a chain of hills and from some of the altitudes it was possible for a soldier to look back over the land from whence he had come, and turn around and peer into the terrain of the future, the dragon's teeth and the home of the enemy.

One inclined to indulge in retrospect might have nursed memories far beyond the immediate past and the Battle of the Bulge. He may have remembered Monterey with its sparkling bay, its fishing smacks, its historical landmarks and its Presidio overlooking the town from its lofty perch atop the hill. He may have remembered the gay atmosphere of Carmel by the Sea, a rendezvous that beckoned during after-duty hours. All these memories were once realities — part of the reactivation of the III Corps.

In December 1940 the Corps, which had gained considerable fame in four major battles in World War I, was called upon to play another combat role in the second conflict. During its development in



the United States, the Corps participated in the defensive organization of the nation's West Coast at a time when the Japanese threat was a serious concern. It then moved early in 1942 to Fort McPherson, Georgia, and two years later back to Presidio of Monterey, California, where it became a separate Corps. The unit had engaged in four maneuvers and had trained thousands of troops, including thirty-three divisions, for combat. It had been commanded by Major Generals Walter K. Wilson, Joseph W. Stilwell, John P. Lucas, Harold R. Bull, and John Millikin. Among the Chiefs of Staff who served during this time was Brig. General Lawrence B. Keiser (then Colonel) who was with Corps from the spring of 1942 until the autumn of 1943. Colonel James H. Phillips succeeded Colonel Keiser in December 1943 and has since served the Corps in that capacity.

Upon completion of its domestic mission at Monterey, the Corps left California August 23, 1944, for Camp Myles Standish near Boston, Massachusetts, and embarked for overseas duty on September 5. It was preceded by an advance detachment, consisting of chiefs of the general and special staff sections and selected enlisted personnel, which had arrived at Cherbourg, France, a short time before. Corps was promptly assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army and given the code name of "Century" which it retained throughout the war. Headquarters was established in Carteret, Normandy, and for six weeks the Corps acted as representative of the Ninth U. S. Army on the Cotentin Peninsula, assisting in

the reception and processing of all troops of the Twelfth Army Group arriving on Normandy beaches.

It was while the Corps was in Carteret that the call came for transportation to supply the thirsty tanks and hungry guns that were chasing a dazed enemy past the Capital City of France to the German border.

"Furnish truck companies!" was the order. In compliance, Corps organized 45 provisional truck companies from the troops under its command, and put them on the highways with the famed "Red Ball Express." Throughout ensuing days and nights the "Red Ball Express" rolled to the far reaches of

France with the sinews of war.

On October 10, the Corps was assigned to General George S. Patton's Third U. S. Army and later in the month moved to Etain, France, to await operational orders. Because of the type of campaign fought in those hectic autumn months in which there was no time for regrouping, the Corps was forced to wait until the afternoon of December 8—one day following the third anniversary of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor—to become operational.

The fall of Fort Jeanne D'Arce was the Corps first prize.



*German civilians smilingly wave white flag of surrender.
German civilians read our Military Government proclama-
tions.
Corps Artillery wire trucks at dry spot in Hurtgen Forest.*

*German civilians salvage belongings from wrecked homes.
105-mm howitzer in action, 1st Infantry Division.
9th Division Infantry move through Nideggen, Germany.*

First to Cross the Rhine - Remagen

ROER RIVER CROSSING

With the Bastogne Bulge forever erased, the Germans straightened their lines as best they could, General Patton rolled up his sleeves for another crack at "the b...ds," and the III Corps changed families. The Allied board of strategy had designs on the rich industrial Ruhr Valley and there was dire need for added power in the attacking machinery.

Shortly after establishing a bridgehead in the Siegfried Line across the Our River, III Corps was relieved from duty with the Third Army and dispatched post haste to General Hodges' First Army to replace XVIII Airborne Corps. The headquarters was located in the village of Zweifall, east of Aachen in Germany.

At the time of the Corps arrival, the enemy had been driven into well prepared defenses east of the Roer River. The Wehrmacht hoped to defend successfully the Cologne Plain which stretched away to the great Rhine River, the final natural barrier of any consequence within the Reich.

Both the river and the terrain were pro-German in every respect. The Roer, itself, was a wild twisting unpredictable thing swollen to a turbulent flood stage by shattered dams at the headwaters. The discharge valves of the huge Schwammeneel Dam, which stored a reservoir content of 100,700,000 cubic meters of water, had been demolished, and the conduit which furnished water to the Heimbach power station from the Urfttalsperre Reservoir had been ruptured. The tremendous amounts of water flowing through these ducts, plus the heavy rainfall, had transformed the normally slow current into a capricious maelstrom of defense.

On the enemy side of the Roer rapids, the precipitous terrain with devilish slopes afforded the Germans overpowering observation. But not too many miles away lay the magic waters of the Rhine,

a beckoning goal that many thought would spell victory.

The assault, originally scheduled for 10 February, was postponed four times because of unfordable rapids, but on the morning of the 23rd, the VII Corps on the left flank jumped off and pushed elements of nine battalions over the river against light opposition. Two days later, according to plan, III Corps troops—doughboys of the 1st Infantry Division's 16th Infantry—began crossing over bridges of the VII Corps' 8th Infantry Division. Later in the afternoon elements of the 9th Infantry Division went across to strengthen the bridgehead, and drove south some 1500 yards before nightfall.

The following day the 1st Division continued to push south and southeast, and before darkness settled down, III Corps troops had captured five towns in addition to three the previous day. The attack tempo was stepped up. Under gray skies that emitted chill sporadic showers, the infantry, supported by precision artillery shelling, continued to move despite desperate Nazi resistance at key points in their plan of defense. Seven more villages fell to the assaulting III Corps ranks on the third day of the attack, with the big battering ram shouldered chiefly by the men of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions. The 78th Division maintained defensive positions west of the Roer, but its 311th Infantry crossed the river and picked up 2,000 yards.

The 9th Armored Division, slated to become world famous within the week, crossed and slipped into the III Corps attack on the last day of February and inconspicuously sharpened its claws for the inevitable kill to come.

The III Corps Artillery, meanwhile, had moved its headquarters to a former German strongpoint of pillboxes in the vicinity of Germeter, about 10 miles southeast of Aachen.


It was apparent as February passed into history



CP 1st Infantry Division, Hurtgen Forest—right to left: Lt. Gen. Bradley, CG Twelfth Army Gp.; Brig. Gen. Andrus, CG 1st Inf. Div.; Maj. Gen. John Millikin, CG, III Corps.



Sentry warns jeep "Road under enemy fire."



that the Nazis again had lost another foothold in their defense of the Reich. Where but a week previous the Wehrmacht and SS had been solidly entrenched in fortified areas overlooking the swirling Roer River, there was now nothing but American troops, German civilians, and the necessary evil of war—shattered villages. Ahead, rolling rapidly across the relatively smooth plain of Cologne was the III Corps juggernaut—battle wise now, enthusiastic, and confident of ultimate success.

THEY DIDN'T WATCH ON THE RHINE

A vibrant tension gripped the Phantom command and keyed fighting nerves to a kickoff pitch. Excitement was contagious. Expectancy was in the air. Assault elements were nearing the traditional barrier of the Rhine. It was here that the House of Hitler would either stand on its pillars of tyranny or disappear into the quicksands of oblivion.

On March 4, Corps headquarters crossed the Roer and moved into the village rubble that once was Nideggen. The town was pocked with gaping shell holes. The buildings were gutted and spread on the streets. Away to the east, Corps armor and infantry had broken loose against inconsistent resistance and were moving with unprecedented speed toward the Rhine. The coordination between the branches of the ground forces was smooth and efficient. It was a union of armored mobility and individual exploit. German strong points fell in spectacular sequence. The Rhine—historic barrier in which the Nazis pooled their final hopes—was within reach. The 1st Division was moving on Bonn,

due to fall soon to the assaulting forces of the III Corps. The 9th Division was knocking at the gates of Bad Godesburg. The 9th Armored Division and the 78th Infantry Division were racing to Remagen and resort towns along the Ahr River. Corps was well on the way towards accomplishing its mission—reaching the Rhine, then turning south to effect a juncture with Third U. S. Army coming up from the south—when electrifying news came at 1630 on March 7.

The Remagen bridge was ours!

The world was astounded. Wires hummed, black headlines screamed the news to countless thousands, and military lines buzzed with reports and orders. III Corps was surprised too, but the Corps Commander, wily in the ways of combat technique, had not overlooked the possibility of taking a Rhine River bridge. Several days previously, while planning the operation, he had nursed an "Irish hunch" that a bridge, and particularly the Ludendorff Bridge, might be taken intact. He had requested that the bridge not be bombed, and had directed that only timed and "Pozit" artillery fire be placed on it. He had discussed the possibility with Major General John W. Leonard, the 9th Armored Division Commander, advising him that "if you get that black line across the blue"—referring to a map—"your name will go down in history."

CC"B" of the 9th Armored, commanded by Brigadier General William Hoge, had raced to the site of the bridge and had so surprised the weary Germans that the river structure was found to be virtually undamaged.



Speed was essential. Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Engaman, Commanding Officer of the 14th Tank Battalion, dispatched infantry and engineer elements to the east side of the river despite the fact that the bridge was a potential arch of disaster. At any moment the Germans might detonate the charges that would turn the span into a flying mass of steel and debris. Hurriedly the men ran. The fate of thousands of soldiers hung in the balance. If the bridge were saved it meant a tremendous shortening of the war.

The surprise borne of the armored speed paid off.

The enemy had prepared the bridge for demolition but only two charges were fired. Structurally the bridge remained intact and the Allied world rejoiced.

Colonel Harry Johnson, Chief-of-Staff of the 9th Armored Division—III Corps' crack tank unit—called Colonel James H. Phillips, Corps Chief-of-Staff, and alerted him concerning the seizure of the vital span.

With the Corps Commander, General Millikin, visiting the headquarters of the 78th Division, Colonel Phillips issued subsequent orders. He instructed the 9th Armored to strike while the iron was hot, to exploit the bridgehead as extensively as possible without jeopardizing the Corps holds on the Ahr River towns and bridgeheads. The Chief of Staff then contacted General Millikin who confirmed the instructions, and immediately made plans to motorize the 47th Infantry of the 9th Infantry Division for quick development of the bridgehead. Regimental combat team 311 of the 78th Division was alerted for movement to the scene of the coup.



Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen from west bank—shortly after capture.

During lull in shelling German PWs are brought across the Rhine.

Ludendorff Bridge from east bank showing bomb damage.

Half-track winds way across damaged bridge—Note sign on tower.

ISOLATING THE BATTLEFIELD

From the artillery viewpoint, there was good hunting in all enemy sectors.

"The day the bridge was taken," says the Artillery Journal, "Brigadier General Paul V. Kane, Artillery Commander, saw that with artillery support the bridge could be held. The plan called for the artillery to move as quickly and as close to the Rhine as possible, and to lay heavy fire on the bridgehead area to isolate the bridgehead and deny the enemy access to it. Long range guns were moved well forward to fire on targets miles beyond the river and to interdict the Frankfort autobahn as well as secondary roads and junctions. Tanks and TDs, from positions west of the river, poured their rain of destruction on juicy Nazi targets. During the night of 8-9 March, Corps Artillery fired 50 interdiction missions to protect the small bridgehead.

"Prior to March 12, because of the numerous hills encountered during the fighting, III Corps sound and flash battalions had been unable to locate and destroy many enemy artillery units. Between March 12-15, however, this situation was almost reversed and the bulk of the German artillery in the III Corps sector was either destroyed or continuously harassed."



Vehicles cross Rhine on heavy pontoon bridge constructed by Corps Engineers at Kripp-Linz.

OLD MAN TROUBLE

While the artillery was punching the Nazis at long range, Corps was exploiting its infantry and armored power, but not without difficulties, for the situation was full of complexities.

In the natural course of assault Corps Infantry divisions had been employed and engaged on a wide front which had rendered it impossible to transfer any complete unit to the critical Remagen area. Hence every unit was screened for fighting strength. The result was the formation of a heterogeneous parade of infantry, composed of elements from all III Corps units; temporarily committed to the command of CC"B", 9th Armored Division.

The plan was to strike quickly and develop as rapidly as possible the bridgehead advantage achieved. The 7th Armored Division was promptly attached to the Corps to increase the lightning

punch essential for the knock-out blow. The 2nd Infantry Division, under V Corps, relieved the 78th Division and CC"A" of the 9th Armored. A 90mm anti-aircraft gun battalion, a treadway bridge company, and a "Duck" (amphibious truck) company were hurried to the bridge site.

Plans for anti-aircraft defense of the bridgehead were begun in the evening with the burden of initial protection placed upon the shoulders of the 432nd AAA Battalion. Arrangements for air cover were also completed. General Hodges assured the Corps that planes were available from any base on the continent or the United Kingdom, weather permitting.

The weather, generally, was cold with a nasty drizzle. Overcast skies had grounded the aircraft, which was a temporary blessing, for the engineers needed precious moments to strengthen the bridge and supporting treadways. Although the Luftwaffe had had its wings clipped, the Germans certainly had something left with which to patrol the skies.

General Millikin visited the site and his presence seemed to key the men to greater effort. For the time being, it was partially an engineer show.

The running diary of one day's activities—March 10, taken from a journal kept by the Engineer section of the III Corps, probably tells the exciting story of the drama better than any other source.

100001 - 100300—All work discontinued at all sites due to enemy artillery action. Raking fire of several guns was sweeping treadway construction area. Great deal of air burst artillery shells being used. Appeared to be direct fire with close in observation. One compressor and two cranes knocked out; 20 floats completely assembled with tread attached were hit, which required that they be removed from the water, disassembled and patched. (This means that 312 feet additional bridging will have to be constructed and a delay in the progress of the bridge of about 5 hours).

100300 - 101205—Enemy artillery continues interdicting railway bridge with observed artillery fire, approximately one round every 30 seconds on east abutment and east tower. Infantry crossing on foot having large number of casualties.

101205—Work stopped by enemy observed artillery fire. Railway bridge and east tower and abutment and approach catching hell. One round of heavy stuff every 5 minutes on treadway site.

101225—Railway bridge bombed and strafed.

101230—Enemy artillery scored direct hit on treadway bridge at west end. 15 floats ruined. Going ahead and building bridge to far shore as treads are holding damaged portion in place. Damaged floats will be replaced when bridge has been completed. One Brockway knocked out.

101330—Colonel Orsinger, Century G-4, called to talk over supplying of units on the far shore.

101400—Lieutenant Erwin, 9th Infantry Division gave us information that all enemy OP's were being smoked by the artillery and that rope supplies were at west approach of treadway bridge. Ferry site No. 3 ready for foot troops. Seven LCVP's available.

101500—Artillery representatives called at CP, Colonel Williams, III Corps and Colonel Perry of Army. Sent message to Army Engineer by Colonel Perry for additional pontoon and treadway material for reserve.

101545 - 101730—Bombed and strafed.

101600—Pontoon bridge started.

101710—Treadway bridge reached far shore. Total length, 1032 feet. 17 casualties for the day and 3 air compressors.

101830—Bombed. Had 6 rounds of heavy artillery at pontoon bridge site. Continuous shelling of west bridge approach.

Consolidation of the bridgehead was truly a most difficult job carried on beneath an almost perpetual rain of German explosives. The story of the Engineers Rhine exploits is in itself a fascinating saga of planning and execution.

Colonel F. Russell Lyons, Corps Engineer, who was in charge of Engineering Operations at the bridgesite, briefly recounts something of the technical background relative to the seizure and collapse of the great Ludendorff.

According to Colonel Lyons: "Since the Russian Campaign of 1813 when Napoleon forced a crossing of the Rhine River, military engineers the world over have studied the river in detail and have fought many map problems along its shores. It is a fascinating river in many respects, particularly from the point of view of geology, folklore, commerce, and as a natural barrier and defensive line for the western portion of the German Reich. Many detailed staff studies for a forced crossing of the Rhine River had been made by our higher echelons, but they had been confined to relatively narrow selected areas, particularly where the terrain, road net, and observation favored an attack.


"During the race from the Roer to the Rhine, our engineer means were disposed to the right flank in order to facilitate crossing of the Ahr River, in

view of our general trend to the south for the purpose of linking up with elements of the Third Army. This was the engineer situation when the news of the seizure of the bridge reached Corps.

"In the general scheme of things, the Second British Army and the Ninth American Army, under the British Twenty-First Army Group, were to make the main allied crossing of the Rhine farther to the north, in the general vicinity of the Ruhr River. But here at a totally unexpected site was a gift—a bridge intact, though somewhat damaged, by means of which it might be possible to pierce the Nazis' last natural line of defense in the west. Could we exploit this stroke of luck? Could we shift 90 degrees from the south and strike due east? The success of the mission depended on the rapidity of our actions, and the mustering of sufficient means and personnel in the critical area within the next three days to defeat the inevitable German counter-attack. Poor road nets, hilly and rugged terrain, on the north bank, plus good observation for the enemy, greatly increased our difficulties.

"An immediate officer reconnaissance was made of the bridge and it was found that the main multiple panel point of the east truss and adjacent to the north pier had been blown. Our Pozit and time artillery fire had also inflicted some damage, but none of a vital nature. The flooring was gone in places, the floor beams were out, and the approach span on the south side had been severed, but it was still possible to "weave" one's way across the bridge without falling into the river.

"Once we captured the bridge, the German aviation and artillery immediately proceeded to interdict it. Naturally, other means of crossing the river had to be installed at once. On the night of the 7th, a general plan of bridging operations was developed and to some extent it followed the typical river crossing pattern, minus the assault phase. The construction of ferries was to be followed by the construction of floating bridges and use of LCVP's. The problem of engineer supply for a crossing of this magnitude was tremendous. Three heavy pontoon battalions were required, none of which were



"Old Man Trouble" after collapse—he had served our purpose well.

initially with the Corps. An amphibious truck company was needed and a large naval detachment consisting of LCV's and Sea-mules was needed. Additional treadway would be required. Nets and booms would be required to guard against Gamm swimmers and other floating or submarine missiles directed against the crossing.

"Most of the additional equipment and personnel required for carrying out the above plan was sent up by Army and placed under the Corps in the status of "operational control." Actually the Army Engineer units took their orders and instructions from the Corps Engineer and were fitted into the general plan for the construction of additional crossings over the river.

"The original plan was carried out with a few minor variations which developed as a result of local reconnaissance at the sites. As the tactical situation developed, it became apparent that the site initially selected for the heavy pontoon bridge could not be used because for several days the German artillery concentrated their fire at that crossing, which was in the vicinity of the Ludendorff and the treadway bridge, then under construction. It was therefore decided to shift back to a site selected at Kripp-Linz, where less interference by enemy shell fire was experienced. The treadway was completed in approximately twenty-four hours, and upon completion of the heavy pontoon bridge, traffic was stopped on the Ludendorff in order to facilitate repairs."

"By March 11, then, we had a 40 ton bridge and a 25 ton bridge, over which, in one direction, a maximum of 300 vehicles per hour could readily pass. The road net and the maneuver room on the north or right bank, however, limited the capacity of each bridge to an average rate of 100 vehicles per hour. Throughout the entire period, the ferries and LCV's continued to operate. Elaborate measures were taken to protect the bridge. An all around force of the U. S. Army and Navy, and of our British Allies was welded into a team that successfully constructed the crossings, operated them, furnished local security guards, controlled the traffic at the bridge sites, and finally crossed the major part of an Army over its three bridges. This was all accomplished in a matter of 10 days.

"The one heartache of the crossing was the collapse of the Ludendorff bridge on the afternoon of March 17. As previously pointed out, it had been subjected to heavy artillery fire of all calibers, and in the early stages of the crossing, the rate at times was one round every 30 seconds. It had withstood the effect of this artillery fire, heavy air bombing and even the near hits of German V-2 rocket bombs (this was the first time Germans had used V-2s against a tactical target). However, in one of those lulls so frequent in battle, and at a time when the engineers were clearing their equipment and plant from the bridge, the rivets in the crown pieces of the steel arches started to sheer and crack like rifle shots. This was the end. The main arches rotated to the eastward or upstream, and pulled the approach spans off their rollers, dropping them on to the shore line and into the river. It was simply a



General Eisenhower crosses Rhine on visit to III Corps front.

case where the "old lady" suffered metal fatigue and collapsed.

"The capture of the bridge and the successful forced crossing saved much in time, life and treasure. The war was shortened by at least two months, the casualty toll was reduced by approximately 35,000 men, and an estimated saving of \$600,000,000 resulted. Several high ranking German officers, when questioned as to the turning point of the war, answered that the capture of the Remagen Bridge and the quick establishment of the bridgehead broke the last line of German defense."

The great Ludendorff bridge died a tragic death. But before she succumbed she had fulfilled her mission. Previous to her untimely collapse, this vital artery had played a tremendous role in feeding into the bridgehead the troops essential to the expansion of the foothold—troops of the 9th, 78th, 99th Infantry Divisions and the greater part of the 9th Armored Division as well as supporting TDs, tanks, AAA units and artillery. A typical German die-hard, the span took a toll of American lives in her backbreaking plunge into the Rhine. But those lives were not in vain, for it was through the diligent 24-hour labors of the engineers that the bridge grudgingly gave herself to the Allied cause.

During the critical last hours of the Ludendorff, the enemy tried every conceivable means of smashing both it and the pontoons from anchorage. Scraping the bottom of the barrel of initiative, the Nazis tried on one occasion to send "human sharks" after the spans. On the night of March 17-18 seven SS "Gamm-Swimmers" donned their rubber suits with webbed feet and hands, and floated down the Rhine with demolitions carried on rafts for purposes of destruction. The swimmers were discovered and fired on in the water about two miles from the nearest bridge; one was killed, four were taken prisoner, one escaped to enemy lines, and the fate of the seventh remains a mystery.

Every precaution was taken by the III Corps—using the facilities put at its disposal by the First Army—in safeguarding the Ludendorff. Within a few days time a total of nine anti-aircraft automatic



Machine gunner of 14th Cavalry Group protects Rhine bridges.

weapons battalions, and four antiaircraft gun battalions had been emplaced at the site. During the first eight days, these guns destroyed 96 and damaged 29 planes out of a total of 368 attacking aircraft, many of which were jet-propelled. Balloons

were brought in, and continuous air cover was flown over the bridge. Contact, log, and net booms were constructed across the river to intercept water-borne objects; depth charges were dropped at an average rate of twelve per hour each night to discourage under water craft; river patrols were maintained; shore patrols were on the alert twenty-four hours per day; high velocity guns were installed along the river to fire at any thing suspicious; and at night powerful lights illuminated the river's surface to turn darkness into day.

Thus was the bridgehead converted into a stabilized springboard from which the Phantom Corp was again prepared to strike at the enemy—this time to disembowel once and for all the Nazi menace which had threatened to roam the world.

For its action at the bridge site in establishing and maintaining communications the Corps Signal unit, the 94th Signal Battalion, received a Presidential Unit Citation. This battalion, always a workhorse, set up radio nets, re-established telephone lines as fast as they were knocked out and kept communications going in spite of the heavy fire and casualties received.

Encircling the Ruhr

A NEW COMMANDER

The day—March 17—was significant in III Corps history. Major General James A. Van Fleet relieved Major General Millikin, who was transferred to Twelfth Army Group. The new commander—broad-shouldered, hard fisted General Van Fleet learned his first set of offensive tactics on the football field at the United States Military Academy. The West Point athlete, a disciple of Five Army Commanders—Bradley, Simpson, Patton, Gerow and Hodges—and battle experienced in most of the major actions since D-Day, placed his entire trust in the age-old axiom, "Attack! Attack!" His judgment, exercised at Metz and in the Bastogne action as Commander of the 90th Division, had earned for him an enviable reputation and the complete confidence of the III Corps staff.

Gathering his reins together, General Van Fleet made ready to drive deep into the Reich. On 19 March the bridgehead was large enough and strong enough to receive the artillery, and that group became the first Corps FDC ever to cross the historic waters. Two days later, on March 21, the III became the first corps to establish itself east of the Rhine, when it opened its TAC CP at Linz. By 22 March the Rhine bridgehead had assumed the proportions of a new front and the danger of losing the foothold had been dissipated.

Preliminary to the major attack of First Army planned for the 25th, a limited attack was approved for the Corps for March 23 which would secure the crossings over the Wied River and the high ground east thereof. This attack caught the enemy by surprise and rolled forward with rapid progress. By the close of the day the 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions had advanced 5,000 yards, captured a number of villages and prepared the way for the major push which was scheduled to move southeast toward Limburg. This limited advance gave the Corps greater maneuver space and improved the roadnet over which to commit armor.

The breakout from the Remagen Bridgehead on 25 March was initiated by the attack of the 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions followed by the committing of the 7th Armored Division through the infantry approximately 24 hours later. At a conference of division and unit commanders and the Corps Staff, on 24 March, Major General Van Fleet pointed out that this attack demanded that the infantry crack the enemy's main defenses, push on to a better road net some 3 miles distant, clear mines and other obstacles for the armor; thus permitting the tanks to reach a good road net in rear of the enemy's primary defenses where they would be able to deploy into parallel columns before meeting any enemy. It was decided that the main effort would be made approximately in the center of the Corps zone of assault where the road net parallel to the Frankfort Autobahn promised the maximum in available highway facilities.



High Command visits III Corps CP at Linz—right to left: Lt. Gen. Hodges, CG First Army; General of the Armies Eisenhower; Lt. Gen. Bradley, CG Twelfth Army Gp.; Maj. Gen. Van Fleet, CG III Corps.

The assault was to be pushed with hard-hitting power. Caution was to play a subordinate role to lightning speed and explosive power. Maximum use was to be made of secondary roads by spearhead troops inasmuch as it was expected that blown bridges and other obstacles would impede the advance along the autobahn and other primary roads. Both infantry and armor were directed to push the attack and take advantage of moonlight which was now full.

The stage was set. The sacred soil beyond the Rhine which hadn't borne the imprint of an invading boot since the days of Napoleon now shook beneath the thunder of warming armored engines.

D-Day—March 25—dawned bright and crystal clear with promise that the weather would hold. With irresistible shattering momentum the first waves of infantry power struck with a determination not to be denied. Combat elements of the 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions collided with the foremost points of German resistance, probed deeper into the entrails of the enemy defense and by evening had registered gains of from three to four miles. The 9th Division had seized high ground north of the village of Willroth, while the 99th had battled its way to objectives along the Au River. The infantry advances had carried the Corps through the greater part of the mountainous terrain in the region which had been a stymie in the operational designs of the



waiting armor. Throughout the day and all during the succeeding night infantry and engineers worked feverishly to clear paths through the minefields and obstacles to open unimpeded routes to the jump-off points for the tanks of the 7th Armored Division.

On 26 March with the first rays of dawn scarcely perceptible in the east, the thunderous might of the 7th Armored galvanized into a rolling tiger of steel that picked up impetus with every turn of the treads. Thrusting deep into enemy lines of communication in a classic example of armored exploitation, the tanks split into four parallel columns, bypassing some centers of resistance and overrunning others. The two infantry divisions—their crust breaking job well done—began that thankless job of mopping up after the armor. Each division motorized one combat team in order to be able to keep added infantry strength close to the armor if needed.

The armored hurricane swept thirty miles during the course of the day, into the heart of the Germans' zone of communications.

Now one began to see small groups of the countless thousands of French, Belgians, Russians, Poles and other nationalities which Hitler had overrun. These people—men, women, and often children—the moment they were liberated began to move along the highways to the rear, loaded down with their meager belongings, often using stolen bicycles, wagons, trucks, cars, baby carriages and any other means available to facilitate carrying their belongings. Downtrodden, but with faces shining again, waving, shouting and giving the V-sign to all passers, they had only one thought—get going to the rear—somehow, somewhere, it meant freedom and home again after years of slavery. Nevertheless, this influx began to create major problems of traffic control and feeding which caused the divisions, corps, and higher staffs no end of headaches. Steps had to be taken to freeze these people in place and feed them until they could be collected and turned

over to representatives of their respective governments.

The power, once more, had been turned on full blast. The advance was so rapid that the Artillery with its big guns experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining the hot pace. In a series of quick jumps the FDC displaced to Hummerick, Maxsain and Ehringhausen.

So intense was the assault that problems of liaison and communication became serious factors in troop control. III Corps staff officers were dispatched to the free-wheeling armored elements to assist in coordination of movement. Excitement ran high; the Corps, cynosure of universal eyes, was visited during the day March 26—by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley and Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges.

On 27 March, two days after the armor had been sprung, the tanks raced to the Dill River, grabbed four bridges intact and crossed to continue the assault to the east. Infantry units, mopping up in the path of the armor, registered advances of up to 22 miles and proceeded to occupy positions on the Dill. Meanwhile, the 7th Armored was ordered to roll on, seize crossings over the Lahn River between Marburg and Giessen and effect the capture of Giessen itself. The mission was completed on the following day. Followed closely by the two infantry divisions, the tanks pounded out a new 13 mile advance. During the day the 28th Infantry Division was attached to Corps but could not be employed in combat except upon specific permission from First Army, therefore the Division was utilized for rear area security.

Having seized Giessen, and the crossings and high ground east of the Lahn River, Corps was temporarily halted by First Army on the 28th. Shortly thereafter the direction of attack was changed from the East to the North. This was part of the plan of the High Command to set up the encirclement of the highly industrial Ruhr area. Now it was that the jaws of the trap in the north began slowly to close on the desperate enemy. Corps quickly readjusted its units and within twenty-four hours had advanced north to the Ederstau See, destroying enroute a greater part of the German 166 Infantry Division, newly arrived from Denmark.

The month of March had truly been a month of destiny in the history of the Corps. With every passing day the tempo of assault had been increased to pour more and more pressure on the disorganized enemy. The climax in the month's prisoner bag of 33,795 men captured by Corps troops came during the last week, when more than 16,000 of the enemy were seized. The operations of the latter part of the month were also marked by the release of approximately 100,000 displaced persons, forced laborers and Allied prisoners of war.

From the beginning of the month when the attack swept across the Cologne plain to the time that it was halted at the Ederstau See, the Corps had advanced over 150 airline miles to grab approximately 1500 square miles of German soil.



RATS IN THE RUHR

It was April Fool's Day and the fates were proud of their handiwork. The world's mightiest military machine was cracking like a thin-shelled egg in a high speed fan. The would-be masters of world destiny were counting their days in the sewers of Berlin. With trepidation in their hearts they viewed the mounting crisis in the Valley of the Ruhr. While the III Corps had been pushing east and thence north, the neighboring VII Corps had established a junction with elements of the Ninth U. S. Army to ring a band of infantry and armored steel around an estimated 300,000 Nazi troops.

The jaws of the trap were already closed. The process of mastication was about to begin. It was the job of the III Corps to attack into the pocket at the point of heaviest enemy pressure, generally northwest from the town of Winterburg. Still in the Phantom lineup were the 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions and the 7th Armored Division. The Corps continued to control the 28th Infantry Division, but that unit was not to be committed.

The terrain through which the III Corps was destined to advance was not unlike that which had been encountered east and north from the Rhine River. The area was wooded, and ranged from sweeping slopes to precipitous mountains. The road net, again, was poor and the area was dotted with numerous small streams.


In the north of the Corps zone, there was one good road yet available, but because it ran through a narrow valley it tended to canalize any armored attack. The center of the zone offered the best opportunities for assault and thus General Van Fleet decided to strike straight down the middle with the power of the armor flanked by the two infan-

try divisions. The Corps zone of advance was wedge-shaped — wide at the base and narrowing near the objective. It was planned that the 9th Infantry Division on the right would eventually be pinched out, thereby providing a period of much needed rest for those tired doughboys who had been fighting consistently since February 26.

Under a canopy of grey sky which broke now and then into occasional showers, Corps troops jumped off on the fifth day of April to the west and northwest in the first stage of devouring the enemy. The German resisted stubbornly, capitalizing on defensive advantages found in the wooded, mountainous terrain. But the infantry, sensing the proximity of the kill, was not to be denied and during the first 24 hours advanced some four miles on a broad front to capture twelve towns and a large number of enemy forces.

Picking up momentum, the assault developed in fury. On April 8, advances of up to six miles were scored against resistance that was described as ranging from moderate to stiff. Twenty-three towns were captured and 1,749 PWs were taken. The following day the Corps assumed command of the veteran 5th Division, which had been temporarily transferred from the Third Army to the action in the Ruhr pocket. This addition of another crack infantry unit contributed more powder to the Phantom arsenal, which was perennially blowing up in the face of the sinking German.

By April 9, it was apparent that the III Corps was indeed grinding fine the Nazi grist in its well oiled mill of destruction. Despite the fact that the Phantom troops were attacking at the most sensitive and potentially strongest points in the German front, the assault was moving forward at a sensational pace. Four days after the attack had jumped



**ADVANCES OF
25-MARCH THRU 17-APRIL**

off, the 7th Armored Division was reporting daily gains of at least five miles, while the infantry was registering advances of from 3500 to 5000 yards. Enemy resistance continued stubborn at key terrain features and towns, but was light to nonexistent in heavily wooded areas.

On 10 April, thirty-five towns were cleared and approximately 2500 PWs were taken. The enemy resorted to the use of heavy antiaircraft against the rolling Corps front, but the forward progress was inevitable as death. Again on April 11, Corps elements scored gains of five miles; thirty towns were cleared and 3500 PWs were captured. Impressive though these advances seemed to be at the moment, they were but shadows cast before things to come.

On April 12 the enemy, who previously had engaged in modified delaying actions, seemed suddenly to disintegrate like chaff in the winds. The Corps salient plunged headlong into the German ranks picking up fifteen miles in its relentless sweep, grabbed forty-three towns, and nearly 9,000 prisoners. Among the PW bag that day was Lt. Gen. Friedrich

Kochling, Commander of the LXXI Corps.

Time and again the enemy threw reserve remnants into the saw toothed attack in an effort to stave off impending disaster. But these Wehrmacht troops were powerless against the tide that threatened to engulf them. Towns and German strongpoints fell with the rapidity of clay pigeons before the unerring eye of a champion. The German High Command obviously had nothing left in its famed manpower reservoir to check the surging strength that was fast cutting the Nazis to pieces.

Indicative of the level to which the Nazis had sunk was the shelling of their own towns with direct hits on German hospitals in Fredeburg and Schmallenberg, resulting in considerable casualties to wounded German soldiers. All male civilians able to carry arms were impressed into Nazi service. Towns and villages, when captured, were found to be occupied by old men, women and small children, and German wounded. Those left behind were vehement in their denunciation of the government which had led them into such conditions.

Even the weather had turned anti-Hitler. Bright



PWs taken in Meschede, Germany, by 9th Infantry Division.

German unit which surrendered intact is marched to the rear.

2000 PWs taken in surprise attack on Bellhausen, Germany.

Jeep load of PWs, including high Nazi official.

Gen. Van Fleet and Gen. Lauer, CG 99th Inf. Div. question Russian colonel, one of 23,000 liberated at Memmer, Germany.



Germans surrendering while under fire to 7th Armored Division soldier.

skies put in an appearance and out of surrounding horizons flew planes of the IX TAC to harass the enemy with strafing and bombing.

Meanwhile, III Corps Artillery continued to pound the Rats of the Ruhr with a pattern of fire whenever the assault pace slackened. Displacement of weapons was so continuous there was scarcely time to get up the guns for many heavy missions.

On April 14, there was revealed to the shocked eyes of the conquering troops the inhumanity that was Hemer—Hemer, the prison camp where months of anguish for 23,000 Russian prisoners of war had been climaxed by 10 foodless days—where during a long cruel winter, hundreds had slept on the frozen ground—where emaciated corpses testified to the ravages of tuberculosis, which had taken its inevitable toll. When liberated, inmates were dying at the rate of 150 per day. Prisoner diet, which had consisted of grass and weeds, was now supplanted by nourishing rations from American kitchens. Medical supplies, doctors and assistants were rushed to the camp immediately and within a few days the death rate began to decline rapidly.

Complete collapse on April 15 came to the hopelessly trapped Nazis in the Ruhr vise. They parted at the seams as if victims of an atomic blast. A total of 10,797 prisoners of war were tallied that day in the cages of the III Corps. And this was but a prelude to the terrific enemy cost—45,565 PWs—chalked up on the following day. They came on in never ending streams of broken humanity—a perennial parade of beaten troops who cared not that their dreams of a Nazi Europe had smashed on the pillars of democracy.

The Ruhr from whence had long flowed Germany's industrial blood now held the withered remnants of a totalitarian corpse. Of the 317,000 prisoners taken from the trap, General Van Fleet's

command captured 105,768.

The picture of the mass surrender is graphically described in extracts of the 7th Armored Division's G-2 Periodic Report and Corps' G-2 After Action Report:

"There was no flow of weaklings in the toll of prisoners being processed after the surrender, but rather a cross-section of Germany's existing military machine, including as many types of individuals as there are words to describe them. Their uniforms were as varied as their personalities and their modes of travel more so.

Many units marched to the cages as if in review while others slouched and straggled. A bicycle troop wheeled along in perfect order; a horsedrawn artillery unit paraded to the enclosure, dismounted, unhitched the teams, groomed them, and turned them into the fields. Field kitchens preparing meals were interspersed along the columns. Some tiny autos raced to the cage, evidently their occupants hoped to gain a favored place by early arrival.

A few stragglers stole perambulators to carry their duffle in. Generally speaking, the movement was more orderly than the daylight moves they were accustomed to (no Allied aircraft to harass them). On a follow-the-leader basis, all columns ended at one of our several PW cages. (7th Armored Division G-2 Periodic Report).

"To April 14 the pattern was familiar. But there any resemblance to previous actions ended; heretofore the Germans had always had space—another river, another defensive line, another mountain range, another country to fight for. Now there was nothing but death or surrender.

The veteran 130 Panzer Lehr Division—the demonstration unit of Spanish Civil War days—set the example; it's commander, Colonel Von Hausen surrendered his remaining 2000-3000 troops and all equipment at ALTENA on April 15. Although the remaining enemy troops, now compressed in a pocket roughly 10 kilometers square, offered stiff resistance the rest of that day, they were to follow the example set.

On April 16 the following German commanders surrendered themselves and their commands to III Corps troops:

- Maj. Gen. BAYERLIEN, 53 Corps.
- Maj. Gen. von LUTTWITZ, 47 Panzer Corps.
- Col. ZOLLENKOFF, 9 Panzer Division.
- Brig. Gen. von WALDENBURG, 116 Panzer Division.
- Brig. Gen. DENKERT, 3 Panzer Grenadier Division.
- Brig. Gen. KLOSTERKEMPER, 180 Infantry Division.
- Maj. Gen. HAMMER, 190 Infantry Division.
- Brig. Gen. EWART, 338 Infantry Division.
-, 176 Infantry Division.
- Brig. Gen. ROEMER, 22 AA Division.
- Brig. Gen. EINLER, Fortress Engineer Division.
- "z. b. v."

(III Corps After Action Report).

The Phantom Swings South

BAVARIA—NAZI BIRTHPLACE

By mid-April, Germany was a smashed nation. Her major cities lay demolished under the incessant hammering of Allied bombers. Her great autobahns, built to carry victorious Nazi armies throughout the land, were now racetracks for her conquerors. White banners blossomed in nearly every village and her disillusioned population stood frightened at their windows as the roaring combat columns continued to strip the Reich of her fibre.

The house of Hitler was falling apart. There was friction between the SS and the Wehrmacht; between the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis and the war-weary civilians. There were signs here and there of open insurrection of the people against the war lords.


And yet the death infested land grew green. The hills and forests, as if cognizant of the great evil, sought to camouflage the nation's cancer with a mantle of lush vegetation; but the germs, yet present, had to be dissolved. Bavaria and Berlin were still festering in the German body. The Russians would take care of Berlin, but to seize Bavaria was ours.

The rolling hills and rich green farm lands of

Bavaria, from Nurnberg southeast to the Austrian border, are transversed by four great rivers—the picturesque Altmuhl, the famed Danube, the icy green Isar and finally the Inn, only a few short miles from Austria and Hitler's Berchtesgaden mountain retreat. Tourists, travelling through this rich countryside in the spring of 1930, were entranced by the beauty of the sun-drenched countryside, the charm of the ancient towns and villages and the industry and quiet dignity of the people with their quaint customs and costumes. They admired the magnificence of the snow-capped Alps rising out of the horizon. They enjoyed leisurely days in taverns and beer-halls, some of which were later to ring with Hitler cheers, and which were soon to spawn the scourge of Nazism.

These were the luxuries of 1930—luxuries long lost in the debris that once were cities.

In the spring of 1945 Munich and Nurnberg lay flattened by the devastating blows of Allied air might; disrupted communication lines rendered travel from city to city almost impossible and General George S. Patton's mighty Third Army and General Alexander M. Patch's powerful Seventh Army were thrusting deep into the heart of Nazism's birthplace.



In Nurnberg, on 18 April, 1945, fanatical German troops were battling with all the courage their hearts could muster and with all the strength at their command, to prevent the fall of that great city from whence had come the infamous Nazi racial laws. The city had become to them a symbol.

But the American soldiers were fighting hard too, and just as American soldiers had shown their superiority over the German in every other battle, so were they displaying that superiority now. By April 18 the doughboys of the Seventh Army's XV Corps held approximately three-fourths of the city and were slowly but steadily driving the enemy out. Outside the city, in the green countryside, the enemy was being pushed relentlessly to the southeast back toward the Danube. Civilians were seeing the vaunted Wehrmacht in retreat; they were knowing the indignity of surrender; their white tablecloths and sheets and towels were fluttering from housetops as they discovered for the first time what it was to have a foreign invader take over their lives and destinies.

April 18. The Ruhr Pocket was finished. American armies to the north were racing to meet the advancing Russians. The Bavarian front was shaking. The knockout blow was in sight, and the scene was set for III Corps' last great action of this war.



THE BIG MOVE

In the north the Phantom Corps was completing its task of grinding into nothingness the pocket of the Ruhr. By 16 April, after 11 days of plunging, bucking, hard-hitting fighting, the German defenses had been ripped apart, and on that day the III Corps received another "Top Secret" movement order—an order which was to send the Corps on its last phantom-like movement to a new fighting front—to the Third Army front in Bavaria.

On 17 April, the Commanding General III Corps reported to Headquarters Third U. S. Army. On the 18th, the Corps quietly and unobtrusively packed its belongings, departed Fredeburg, and before midnight appeared on the Third Army scene. The CP was opened at Neustadt, a few miles northwest of Nurnberg, and Corps prepared plans to attack southeast.

Now, it is uncommon indeed for a Corps to move with all its attached combat troops, which may number anywhere from 30,000 to 75,000 men, with all their vast and varied equipment. In the past the Corps had moved with only its normally

attached units: 94th Signal Battalion, Hq and Hq Battery, III Corps Artillery, and the 821st Military Police Company. But in this 275 mile march, Corps brought with it two divisions (36th and 99th Infantry Divisions) and thirty-four other units, ranging from separate companies to battalions and group headquarters. These units, departing from the First Army's zone in a steady stream of fighting strength from the morning of April 18 until the morning of April 20, made the trip in an average time of one day. The Corps had come as a full-fledged, well rounded, combat force, prepared to play a major role in the ringing of the Nazi death knell.

On April 18, 19, 20 and 21, then, Corps gathered itself in its new zone. General Patton assigned a zone of advance to the Corps—a zone of advance which was as a poised spear casting its shadow over Bavaria from Nurnberg to Berchtesgaden, across the four great Bavarian rivers, and pointing toward the mountainous "National Redoubt," where the Nazis would allegedly make their last stand. The advance was to be a rapid one—was to puncture enemy defenses and cause his front to collapse—was to end in an enemy rout. The major obstacles were to be river lines and even here, on these natural barriers which from time immemorial have provided superb defense lines, Corps was to meet quick success. Engineering skill, superior planning and organizing, combined with driving leadership and aggressive armor and infantry, were to pay off.

The assault, vested in the 36th and 99th Infantry Division and the 14th Armored Division, was to jump off on April 22. Subsequent events, however, and decisions of higher headquarters, caused the date for the assault to be pushed back to April 24. The enemy, weakened to a point of collapse and virtually stripped of his implements of war, wasn't expected to generate much resistance. But as always, the German was capable of "milking" whatever resources he had left at his command. He had proven himself a master of delaying actions; he had shown tremendous skill in employing, with one notable exception at Remagen, the science of demolitions; he had had vast experience in the use of mine fields and road blocks. What he lacked in artillery now he made up for in mortars and nebelwerfers; and he now had a number of excellent defense lines.

On April 24, with the 36th Infantry Division on the right, the 99th Infantry Division in the center, the 14th Cavalry Group on the left, and the 14th Armored Division operating in the width of the Corps zone, the Phantom struck. Against spotty resistance the rampaging armor, followed closely by the doughboys of the 99th Infantry Division ploughed to the Altmuhl River, where bridging operations were begun. In the right of the Corps zone the 36th Infantry Division, partially motorized, raced 30 miles to the Altmuhl in the vicinity of Eichstatt, and prepared to take the important river city early of the following morning. In one day of headlong assault the first major barrier had been reached—again the enemy had felt the fury of III Corps which had spelled defeat for him in so many other critical actions. This day the Headquarters, closed following its fighting troops, moved into Schwabach.



Gen. Patton and Gen. Van Fleet study aerial photo of Danube River.

THE BLUE DANUBE

On April 25, the second day of the attack, it was again a story of defeat for the enemy. All major elements of the Corps crossed the river and slashed from five to twelve miles beyond it in a headlong rush to the Danube—the Blue Danube, representing all the romance and charm of ancient Austria and Bavaria. Early in the morning of this day, the 36th Division took Eichstatt, according to plan, and released more than 3,000 allied PWs there. Along the entire front the enemy resisted with mortar, artillery and small arms fire, but the drive continued.

April 26—The attack was two days old and the Danube was reached after advances of from ten to eighteen miles. The 36th Infantry Division, on the right, forced a crossing at Ingolstadt; both the 99th Division and the 14th Armored Division were on the river. The armor barely failed to seize a bridge intact when the leading tank, racing to the structure, saw it blow up in its face. The Corps CP, again pressing forward on the heels of the troops ahead, moved into Beilngries only a few short hours after its capture, and before the stunned civilians had quite recovered from the shock of battle.

April 27—The tempo continued as the 36th Infantry Division raced some twelve miles past the Danube, and the 99th Division made crossings at Heinheim. The 99th Division, however, fell into ill luck as bad road conditions and congested traffic delayed its advance. Poor roads also delayed the movement of the armor and the cavalry over the Danube, so that it was not until the following day that these elements crossed. This time Bavaria herself was aiding the German—her rivers, her canals, her poor roads, her weather—all were combining to impede the advance at a time when the once vaunted Wehrmacht was powerless to do so.

When the armor and cavalry did cross, however, they made up for the unavoidable delay by racing 13 miles toward the Isar while the 36th Division, by nightfall of the 28th, found itself just short of that river.

April 29—Again slashing gains of from 10 to 20 miles along the entire front were recorded. The

front was collapsing—nay, had collapsed. The house of cards was falling. The cause was lost. As the month of April was running out, so was the lifeblood of Hitlerism running out, in the north, in the south, in the east, in the west. Hitler and his swastika butchers had gambled the fate of a nation on the possibility that the world would accept barbarism in lieu of Christianity, slavery in lieu of freedom. The German Army was impotent, and as resistance continued, so did the ranks of enemy prisoners swell.

On 29 April the 14th Armored Division took Mooseburg on the Isar, where the Division overran a PW camp, freeing 35,000 overjoyed Allied soldiers, many of whom were for the first time in five years tasting the ecstasy of freedom. Many were veterans of Dunkirk, Africa, and the first Allied air raids over Europe. The 36th Division took Freising, on the Isar River. The 14th Cavalry Group raced 22 miles, almost to the Isar. The 99th Infantry Division reached the River and the Corps CP pushed ahead to open in Mainburg, a few short miles from the Isar. Two more rivers to cross!

On the 30th the Isar was crossed at three places—Freising, Landshut and Moosburg, and as the month drew to a close, Corps was dashing headlong to the Inn.

The war was almost over; organized resistance by the Germans as a whole ceased during the month. The end had been inevitable since the crossing of the Rhine; it was clearly now at hand. A few weeks more of hopeless fighting in isolated pockets was all the enemy could hope for.

Summing up, Twelfth Army Group published the following communique:

“With the breakthrough of the Allied Armies in Italy, the REDOUBT is already threatened from the south by a drive up the ADIGE to BOLZANO and then through the BRENNER PASS to INNSBRUCK. German forces which at one time may have been earmarked for withdrawal by this route into the Inner Fortress are now being destroyed on the



plains of Northern ITALY. From the north, the line of the ISAR River has been breached and the THIRD U. S. ARMY is driving towards the INN River and closing on the DANUBE to the east. The SEVENTH U. S. ARMY, having crossed the DANUBE and captured MUNICH, is already knocking at the gates of the REDOUBT and closing in on INNSBRUCK which is the western key of the INNER REDOUBT. Once INNSBRUCK is captured, the valleys of the INN and SAALACH provide natural channels into the nerve centers of BAD REICHENHALL, SALZBURG, BERCHTESGADEN and STRAUB.

"In short, in a fundamental sense, GERMANY is beaten. Enemy resources, manpower and the will of the people to resist, have been destroyed. Strategic capabilities are non-existent. There remain pockets, some of them of substantial size, that must be liquidated, but organized resistance under a competent central command has virtually ceased. Such capabilities as the enemy still retains are concerned chiefly with efforts to defer the final annihilation of the fanatics who remain in the isolated forces."




May 1, 1945.—One more river to cross; for the Corps, two more days of combat, for Europe, eight

more days of warfare. The job was almost done. On April 30, Corps had begun its crossings over the Isar, and on May 1 maintained its spectacular rate of advance by ploughing from 10 to 15 miles against light and scattered resistance. The weather, unpredictable with snowy squalls, plus road blocks and blown bridges, served to delay the advance more than did the gasping efforts of the dying Nazis.

FIRST TO CROSS THE INN

On May 2, Corps reached the Inn at several places and became the first Corps to cross that river when CC "A" of the 14th Armored Division seized a combination bridge and dam intact. The armor also captured the city of Muhldorf, while a motorized task force of the 86th Division captured Wasserburg and a bridge intact. For the Phantom III Corps the war was over. A change in boundaries caused Corps to be pinched out while other elements of the Third and Seventh Armies dashed into Czechoslovakia and Austria. For the remaining six days of the war Corps was to remain in Dorfen, into which it had moved on the morning of the 2nd.

The story of Dorfen is not only an interesting



Assault troops, 99th Inf. Div., preparing to cross Danube under fire.

Some liberated Russian PWs.

Troops of 86th Inf. Div. cross Danube on foot bridge under fire.

Russian PWs cheer liberating Americans of 14th Armored and 86th Infantry Divs.



Column of Corps Artillery on move in Bavaria.

tale in itself, but it serves well to illustrate a principle which III Corps had always adhered to—the establishment of the Command Post close behind the fighting fronts to insure close communication with its troops.

When Dorfen was selected as a command post it was well behind the German lines, and as the Headquarters personnel began their movement to that town it had not yet been cleared of the enemy. Small detachments of signal and headquarters personnel, moving up to the city in the early morning hours of May 2 unknowingly passed through

front line infantry elements, and as daylight came the startled occupants, both civilians and military, were dumbfounded to see the small group proceed to take over the city. German soldiers were rounded up, and in a short time 200 had been corralled. By the day's end and as the command post was being set up, the total PW bag for Corps Headquarters, Signal and MP personnel came to 1427, including 600 taken in a military hospital.

Regarding final artillery operations, the unit history states:

"The final phase of combat operations for III Corps Artillery consisted mostly of making frequent long distance moves and trying to "keep up with the war."

On April 24, Corps Artillery's FDC moved 53 miles to Neuen Dettelsau, and delivered reinforcing fires for the 36th and 99th Infantry Divisions plus the 14th Armored Division. The next day Artillery CP opened at Stadelhofen, a move of 45 miles from Neuen Dettelsau and Corps Artillery units closed to the Danube River on April 27. On April 29, headquarters moved to Isareck and remained at this location for the duration of the war.

During the month of April, Corps Artillery Headquarters had displaced 11 times for a total distance of 574 miles. On May 17, the Artillery which had so long chewed at the Nazi war machine moved to Reichenschwand, about 15 miles east of Nurnberg, and took over security control of the area.



Journey's End

For the III Corps the job was "finis." From Metz almost to the Austrian border the command had sought out the enemy to administer overwhelming defeat. The enemy had been routed from Fort Jeanne D'Arc, slaughtered in the Bulge, surprised at Remagen, trapped in the Ruhr and annihilated in Bavaria. From December 8 to May 8 the Corps, in its race through German defenses, grabbed a grand total of 226,103 prisoners and seized more than 4500 square miles of Reich territory. The Phantom unit had been a part of the First, Third, and Ninth U. S. Armies. It had participated in nearly all the critical actions upon which the Allied destiny had precariously hinged.

The Corps had coordinated the efforts of 21 battle components—the 1st, 5th, 9th, 26th, 28th, 35th, 78th, 80th, 86th, 87th, 90th and 99th Infantry Divisions; the 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 14th and 20th Armored Divisions and elements of the 16th Armored Division; and the 17th, 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. It was through the unstinted cooperation of these elements, the spectacular exploits of the Air Corps, and the unsung labors of many smaller specialized units, that the III Corps was able to function smoothly and effectively even under the most adverse circumstances.

Mission accomplished, the Corps temporarily became a part of the vast Army of Occupation in the vicinity of Erlangen, Germany, under control of the Third U. S. Army. Here the Corps directed the protection of vital installations—communication centers, bridges, railroads, factories and warehouses; worked hand in glove with military government authorities, to facilitate the resumption of cer-

tain essential civilian activities; processed prisoners of war; and engaged in all the multifarious activities which an army of occupation is called upon to do. Early in June Corps was selected for return to the United States and redeployment to the Pacific. On the 17th of June the Unit departed from Erlangen and arrived piecemeal during the ensuing two days at Camp Twenty Grand in the vicinity of La Havre, France. The main body boarded the Coast Guard manned Naval Transport, "Wakefield," on June 29 and in the early hours of the following morning the vessel slowly put out to sea, bound for the eastern shores of the United States.

Arriving at the Port of Boston on the afternoon of July 6, Corps personnel entrained to Camp Myles Standish and within 48 hours had dispersed to their many homes throughout the country for 30-day recuperation leaves and furloughs. By 21 August the Corps had reassembled at Camp Polk, Louisiana, to await further assignment—and in some cases personnel discharge—by the War Department.

* * *

Back in Luxembourg, in Belgium, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, the little people began anew to build their lives. In France, soldiers and politicians were brought before national tribunals to answer charges of treason.

In Germany, Nazi rapists sullenly awaited the justice of an Allied court . . . the peasants bent their backs to their ploughshares and the pursuit of peace . . . the forests grew green and the hills were silent in their solitude . . .

Commendations



HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 403

12 February, 1945

SUBJECT: Staff Commendation.

TO : Major General John Millikin, Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U. S. Army.

1. It was with deep regret that I learned that higher authority had transferred you and your Corps to another Army.

2. Although the commendation of the staff of one headquarters by the Chief of Staff of another may well be without precedent, the cheerful and cooperative spirit exhibited by the entire staff of the III Corps during its months under Third U. S. Army, was so outstanding and effective that I cannot refrain from commending them. In this commendation, I express the sentiments of the heads of each and every staff section of the Third U. S. Army.

3. On my behalf, and on the behalf of each and every staff officer of the Third U. S. Army, please extend to the members of your staff our appreciation for their splendid work and our regret that they are no longer with us.

/s/ Hobart R. Gay
/t/ HOBART R. GAY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,

* * * * *

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

10 March, 1945

COMMENDATION

To: Commanding General, First Army.

"The whole Allied Force is delighted to cheer the First U. S. Army whose speed and boldness have won the race to establish the First Bridgehead over the Rhine. Please tell all ranks how proud I am."

(s) EISENHOWER,
Supreme Commander.

To: Commanding General, III Corps, Commanding General, V Corps, Commanding General, VII Corps.

"To the men of the First U. S. Army who won this race, I extend my congratulations. I share the pride of the Supreme Command in their fine achievement."

(s) COURTNEY H. HODGES,
First U. S. Army, Commander.

COMMENDATION

090030A March, 1945.

To: CG Twelfth Army Group pass through First Army to CG III Corps personal for Millikin from CG Third Army signed Patton.

Entire Third Army joins me in heartiest congratulations to you and your command on your slashing advance to the Rhine and brilliant seizure of each bank bridgehead.

* * * * *

To: CG III Corps.

081228 March, 1945.

From: Collins CG VII Corps.

Congratulations to the III Corps and Ninth Armd Div on being the first to cross the Rhine. End.

* * * * *

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Office of the Supreme Commander

7 April, 1945

ORDER OF THE DAY

To: Every Member of the AEF.

The encirclement of the Ruhr by a wide pincer movement has cut off the whole of Army Group "B" and parts of Army Group "H," thus forming a large pocket of enemy troops whose fate is sealed and who are ripe for annihilation. The most vital industrial area is denied to the German war potential. This magnificent feat of arms will bring the war more rapidly to a close. It will long be remembered in history as an outstanding battle—The Battle of the Ruhr.

(s) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Supreme Commander.

* * * * *

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 230

9 May, 1945

Subject: Commendation of Major General James A. Van Fleet, 03847.

To : Major General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303.

On this day of victory in Europe I want to congratulate you and the fighting III Corps on the contribution you have made to the defeat of the German Army.

From the time your Corps joined the First Army on 13 February through its relentless drive to the Rhine, the brilliant bridgehead operation at Remagen and the reduction of the Ruhr pocket its record has been an outstanding one. The troops under your command have fought with courage and determination. Your leadership has been forceful and inspiring.

I desire to commend you, your staff and the officers and men of the units who have served under you. Please let them know I am deeply appreciative of their accomplishments and accept my best personal wishes to you and to III Corps for continued success.

/s/ Courtney H. Hodges
/t/ COURTNEY H. HODGES,
General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Itinerary III Corps

1 August, 1944—Advance left Monterey, California and arrived at Fort Hamilton, New York on 6 August.

11 August, 1944—Advance left New York on the U.S.S. Uruguay and arrived in Glasgow, Scotland, on 22 August.

18 August, 1944—Corps assigned to Ninth U. S. Army, effective upon arrival.

23 August, 1944—Corps left Monterey, Calif.

24 August, 1944—Advance arrived at Winchester, England.

26 August, 1944—Advance departed Southampton, England, aboard British ship (Leopoldville).

28 August, 1944—Advance arrived at Tare Green, Utah Beach, St. Germain, France, and proceeded to Carteret, France, on 29 August and established advance CP.

29 August, 1944—Corps arrived at Camp Myles Standish.

4 September, 1944—Corps boarded the U.S.S. Monticello (former Italian Luxury Liner, "Count di Grande"). Commanding General landed at Cherbourg, France.

5 September, 1944—Sailed from Boston.

15 September, 1944—Landed in Cherbourg, France. Proceeded to Carteret, France.

10 October, 1944—Corps assigned to Third U. S. Army.

20 October, 1944—Advance party left Carteret for Nancy (via Paris). Arrived 21 October.

31 October, 1944—Main body left Carteret and camped at St. Anne and at Arcis sur Aube, arriving at Etain, Meuse, 2 November. Advance party arrived in Etain 31 October.

6 December, 1944—Forward echelon moved to Metz, France.

7 December, 1944—Rear echelon moved to Metz, France.

8 December, 1944—Corps responsible for final reduction of remaining forts at Metz, France.

18 December, 1944—Corps ordered to Longwy to meet the German counteroffensive.

19 December, 1944—Forward echelon moved to Longwy and then Luxembourg City.

20 December, 1944—Forward echelon moved to Arlon, Belgium.

23 December, 1944—Rear echelon moved to Longwy, France, and on the 24th moved into Herseange, France.

20 January, 1945—Forward TAC moved to Haut Martelange, Luxembourg.

28 January, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Arlon, Belgium.

10 February, 1945—Corps was assigned to First U. S. Army.

11 February, 1945—Advance detachment moved to Spa, Belgium.

12 February, 1945—Forward TAC moved to Zweifall, Germany. Forward echelon moved to Raeren, Belgium.

15 February, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Zweifall, Germany, and rear echelon moved to Raeren, Belgium.

4 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Niddegen, Germany.

6 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Zulpich, Germany.

7 March, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Zweifall, Germany. Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, Germany, was seized.

9 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Rheinbach, Germany.

12 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Bad Neuenahr, Germany.

13 March, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Rheinbach, Germany.

21 March, 1945—Forward TAC moved to Linz, Germany.

24 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Linz, Germany.

25 March, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Bad Neuenahr, Germany.

28 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Selters, Germany.

29 March, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Erda, Germany.

1 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Rauschenberg, Germany. Rear echelon moved to Selters, Germany.

4 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Frankenburg, Germany.

5 April, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Bad Wildungen, Germany.

10 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Fredeburg, Germany.

13 April, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Reinhardtsquelle, Germany.

17 April, 1945—Corps was reassigned to Third U. S. Army.

19 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Neustadt, Germany.

24 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Schwabach, Germany. Rear echelon left Reinhardtsquelle and bivouaced in Schwarzenberg Castle.

25 April, 1945—Rear echelon arrived at Neustadt, Germany.

26 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Beilngreis, Germany.

28 April, 1945—Rear echelon moved to Schwabach, Germany.

29 April, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Mainburg, Germany.

2 May, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Dorfen, Germany.

8 May, 1945—V-E Day.

12 May, 1945—Forward echelon moved to Erlangen, Germany.


16 June, 1945—Rear echelon joined forward at Erlangen, Germany. Forward and rear departed Erlangen via truck convoy on 17 June. Bivouaced the night of the 17th at Kaiserlautern, Germany; 18 June bivouaced at Metz, France, and on the night of 19 June bivouaced at Soissons, France. Arrived at Camp Twenty Grand on the outskirts of Rouen, France, on June 20.

24 June, 1945—Advance party left Le Havre, France on U.S.S. Cristobal.

29 June, 1945—Departed from Camp Twenty Grand and proceeded to Le Havre, France. Boarded the U.S.S. Wakefield in Le Havre harbor and sailed from Le Havre, France, on 30 June.


2 July, 1945—Advance party arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and proceeded to Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia.

6 July, 1945—Arrived in Boston and proceeded to Camp Myles Standish, Mass.



CP LOCATIONS - HQ III CORPS ARTILERY

ITINERARY III CORPS ARTILERY



- 28 Aug 44 Hq & Hq Stry III Corps Arty departed from Monterey, California by rail from NYPE.
- 1 Sept 44 Arrived Ft Slocum at 2305.
- 11 Sept 44 Departed Ft Slocum by motor convoy for embarkation. Boarded HMT Rangitata at 2145.
- 12 Sept 44 Sailed from NYPE at 0315.
- 23 Sept 44 Docked at Princess Landing, Liverpool, England.
- 24 Sept 44 Debarked at 0200 and entrained for Southampton. Arrived Southampton at 1400 and boarded HMT Chesdire at 1500 for movement to France.
- 25 Sept 44 Arrived Omaha Beach, 2 miles north of Colleville, France.
- 26 Sept 44 Arrived III Corps field Headquarters at Cartaret, France at 0230
- 27 Oct 44 Departed Cartaret at 0600. Arrived St. Anne, France at 1800.
- 28 Oct 44 Departed St. Anne at 0800. Arrived Rheims, France at 2000.
- 29 Oct 44 Departed Rheims at 0800. Arrived Onville, France, first combat CP at 1500.
- 17 June 45 Departed Reicheneshwand, Germany by motor convoy for redeployment through the U.S. Arrived Kaiserlautern, Germany at 1800.
- 18 June 45 Departed Kaiserlautern at 0900. Arrived Metz, France at 1430.
- 19 June 45 Departed Metz at 0600. Arrived Soissons, France at 1715.
- 20 June 45 Departed Soissons at 0900. Arrived Camp Twenty Grand, vicinity Dunair, France at 1615.
- 29 June 45 Departed Camp Twenty Grand at 0740 by motor convoy for Le Havre, France. Embarked on USS Wakefield for United States.
- 30 June 45 Sailed from Le Havre.
- 6 July 45 Arrived Boston POE.

... COMBAT DIVISIONS.....III CORPS....

DIVISIONS	METZ	BATTLE OF THE BULGE	ROER To REMGAN	RHINE To THE RUHR	BAVARIA
	DEC 8 to 19	DEC 20 THRU FEB 11	FEB 13 THRU MAR 7	MAR 7 THRU APR 18	APR 18 THRU MAY 8
1 ST INF DIV.					
5 TH INF DIV.					
9 TH INF DIV.					
26 TH INF DIV.					
28 TH INF DIV.					
35 TH INF DIV.					
78 TH INF DIV.					
80 TH INF DIV.					
86 TH INF DIV.					
87 TH INF DIV.					
90 TH INF DIV.					
99 TH INF DIV.					
4 TH ARMD DIV.					
6 TH ARMD DIV.					
7 TH ARMD DIV.					
9 TH ARMD DIV.					
14 TH ARMD DIV.					
17 TH AB DIV.					
82 ND AB DIV.					
101 ST AB DIV.					

Roster of Personnel

COMMANDING GENERAL
MAJOR GENERAL JAMES A. VAN FLEET

PERSONAL STAFF
MAJOR DONALD P. KAADE
MAJOR ROBERT H. WITHERINGTON

CHIEF OF STAFF
COLONEL JAMES H. PHILLIPS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
COLONEL HENRY E. SANDERSON

M/Sgt. DALTON H. BAGGETT
Tec. 4 MORTON R. BROWN

G-1 SECTION

Major Charles A. Fleming
1st Lt. Richard D. Knight
M/Sgt. Harold D. Davis
T/Sgt. Willard V. Loveridge

Tec. 3 Frank L. Hardeman
Tec. 4 Francis P. Collins
Tec 4 Ralph J. Leyschok

G-2 SECTION

Captain A. B. Landis
CWO Benjamin J. Thompson
M/Sgt. Donald J. Johnson
T/Sgt. Douglas A. Sears
Tec. 3 Donald A. Lewis
Sgt. Abraham Krassen

Tec. 4 William H. Riley
Tec. 4 Edward P. Townsend
Tec. 4 Jack Zinamon
Pfc. Edwin R. Baron
Pfc. J. F. X. Bungarz
Pfc. Wallis Clarke
Pfc. Harry H. Rine

G-3 SECTION

Captain Roland W. Lashinske
Captain Philip R. Calder, Jr.
Captain Gilmore Stott
Captain Nathan J. Bell
Captain James M. Cummings
Captain Paul J. Heaven
CWO Paul Behee
M/Sgt. Gustav W. Stadig
T/Sgt. Marvin J. Beale
S/Sgt. Joseph V. Colantuono, Jr.
S/Sgt. Paul M. Brown

Tec. 3 Leo M. Larson
Sgt. Alex Orent
Sgt. William C. Gilmore
Tec. 4 Shi G. Goodyne
Tec. 4 Floyd F. Frakes
Cpl. Orin J. Long
Tec. 5 Edward M. Bozalina
Tec. 5 Herman R. Brinkman, Jr.
Tec. 5 Walter Van Putten
Tec. 5 Leonard H. Cohen
Pfc. Roland P. Doyle
Pfc. Raymond C. Hart

G-4 SECTION

Maj. Robert W. Rummele
Capt. Harold O. Fischer
M/Sgt. Thomas M. Connell

S/Sgt. John J. Corcoran
Tec. 3 Carl A. Gossger
Tec. 4 Leonard T. Doyal
Pfc. Charles E. O'Rourke

G-5 SECTION

Maj. Paul C. Snyder
T/Sgt. Andrew E. Black
Tec. 3 Joseph F. Smith

Tec. 4 Frederick Schnabel
Tec. 5 Theodore F. Werner

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Lt. Col. Joseph A. Pongonis
Major James C. Walker
Capt. John F. Orend, Jr.
CWO Stewart W. Freyberger
M/Sgt. David M. Deakins
T/Sgt. Jack W. Buck
T/Sgt. Alfred M. Prato
T/Sgt. Paul O. Shields
T/Sgt. Frank H. Strickland
S/Sgt. Leon M. Glucher
S/Sgt. Edward Cagnitz
S/Sgt. Irwin M. Weddle

S/Sgt. Walter J. Young
Tec. 3 Chester J. Kaczmarzewski
Tec. 3 Otto E. Schoenemann
Sgt. Harry E. Coffman
Tec. 4 William S. Black
Tec. 4 Samuel G. Cowan
Tec. 4 Joseph J. Haggerty
Tec. 4 William G. Meccaughy
Tec. 4 Andrew J. Pasztor
Tec. 4 Albert Seidman
Tec. 4 Harold R. Vifquain
Tec. 4 Joseph A. Zachman

Cpl. Martin Bottigheimer
Cpl. Robert W. Heath
Tec. 5 John J. Boyle
Tec. 5 Leslie J. Brown
Tec. 5 James S. Cooper
Tec. 5 Gerald N. Featherstone
Tec. 5 Basil B. Jones
Tec. 5 Fred L. Medinsky
Tec. 5 Raymond J. Sawinski
Tec. 5 John A. Somma
Tec. 5 Hyman Weisman
Tec. 5 Ralph Wildeboer
Tec. 5 Knox B. Williams

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 Major Benjamin F. Woodman
 2nd Lt. Edward C. Mattie
 S/Sgt. Robert A. McCoy
 Tec. 4 Harold L. Dodda
 Tec. 5 Boleslaus T. Krolczyk
 Tec. 5 Robert B. McLellan
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 Lt. Col. Frederick W. Cropp, Jr.
 CWO Robert C. Jones
 S/Sgt. Louis S. Sondag
 Tec. 4 John V. Wood
 Tec. 5 Wesley E. Sailor
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 Major Karl D. Luedtke
 M/Sgt. John R. Usher
 Tec. 4 Richard J. Farley
 Tec. 4 John D. Wiles
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 Lt. Col. Eugene J. Stann
 Major John E. Langley
 Captain George E. Dowling
 M/Sgt. Thomas Mulkern, Jr.
 T/Sgt. Edwin J. Fletcher
 T/Sgt. Elmer F. Weber
 S/Sgt. Stockton M. Jones
 S/Sgt. Ervin J. Wycoff
 Tec. 3 Dwight S. Cornelius
 Sgt. Henry L. Engel
 Tec. 4 James D. Minor
 Tec. 4 Robert L. Rhoda
 Tec. 5 Alan R. Beaudry
 Tec. 5 John F. Stann
- MAP DEPOT**
 1st Lt. Earl A. Dufenhorst
 Tec. 4 Dale H. Mansfield
 Cpl. John M. Hobbie
 Tec. 5 Robert E. Haskell
 Tec. 5 James N. Thompson
 Pfc. Edward C. Carlson
 Pfc. Joseph Frischman
 Pfc. Alvin W. Old
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 T/Sgt. Dewey Wasser
 S/Sgt. Joseph P. Gunn
 Tec. 3 Axel H. Carlson
 Tec. 4 Vernon F. Irwin
 Tec. 5 William L. Wright
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 Lt. Col. John F. Hunter Speer
 Major Peter B. Wells, Jr.
 CWO George D. Russell
 M/Sgt. Robert L. Lambert
 Tec. 4 Kenneth B. Hagy
 Tec. 4 Ernice Stovall, Jr.
 Tec. 5 Herman L. Petti
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 T/Sgt. Howard L. Eads
 S/Sgt. Charles L. Godwin
 Tec. 4 Frederick E. Dingwall
 Tec. 4 Eldon N. Rich
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 T/Sgt. Kenneth L. Wessel
 S/Sgt. Charles F. Lawrence
 S/Sgt. Sidney Schwartz
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 Tec. 3 Joseph E. Wadlington
 Tec. 4 Charles N. Eischen
 Tec. 4 Roy F. Kirkland
 Tec. 4 Robert J. Ramsey
 Tec. 5 James W. Clark
 Tec. 5 Wilfred L. Dube
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 Captain Martin H. Bridges
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 T/Sgt. George E. Quinn
 Sgt. Clifford H. Hakenholz
 Tec. 4 William H. Tanger, Jr.
 Tec. 5 Walter Samsoe
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 M/Sgt. Leon R. Jones
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 Tec. 4 David W. Davis
 Tec. 4 Harold R. Meckley
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 Lt. Col. Edvard J. Vandercar
 Major Walter P. Jones
 Major Robert E. Barnett
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 M/Sgt. Eugene S. Empey
 Tec. 3 James M. Carpenter
 Tec. 4 Henry G. Huners
 Tec. 4 Robert Plank
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 Tec. 4 Chester S. Hayenski
 Tec. 4 James Mark
 Tec. 5 Keith L. Jackson
 Tec. 5 Ralph C. Johnson
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 Captain Stephen W. Guzy
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 1st Lt. Harry R. Morris
 S/Sgt. Carl V. Maier
 Tec. 4 Rudolph A. Fuchs
 Tec. 5 John M. Sherkus

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Tec. 5 John P. Kelley

Pfc. Donald F. Harang

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Capt. Gerald H. Dillingham
S/Sgt. William M. Whalen
Sgt. Eric J. Goleas

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Major Anthony A. Rozga

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First U. S. Army
Captain William J. Dunkerley,
Third U. S. Army

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British Army

FRENCH LIAISON OFFICERS

Captain Martin R. Laborde,
French Marines
Captain Leon J. Teyssot
French Army

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1st Lt. E. R. Miller
2nd Lt. C. R. Kennell
M/Sgt. M. E. Dannenberg

T/Sgt. R. C. Wilde
T/Sgt. L. D. Corbin
T/Sgt. J. M. Pickens
T/Sgt. N. H. Nass
S/Sgt. M. H. Gamble, Jr.
S/Sgt. W. A. Guthrie

S/Sgt. R. D. Baggs
S/Sgt. J. G. Gilmore, Jr.
Sgt. L. C. Thompson
Tec. 4 F. Simons
Tec. 5 T. White
Pvt. H. R. Kraith

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M/Sgt. H. J. Sheldon

S/Sgt. H. A. Friedrich

Captain H. A. Mohr
2nd Lt. Hodges

MII TEAM NO. 413-G

Tec. 3 W. E. Worm
S/Sgt. G. G. Hepner

Tec. 3 A. P. Fritzen
Tec. 3 I. Gold

2nd Lt. Harry Lindauer
M/Sgt. Frank R. Perls

MII TEAM NO. 449-G

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Tec. 3 Renate H. Sobotka
Tec. 4 Ernest H. Mayer

1st Lt. H. H. Cook
2nd Lt. H. W. Wolf

IPW TEAM NO. 114

T/Sgt. E. Cooper
Tec. 3 C. F. Fransson

Sgt. R. U. Nitka
Tec. 5 A. Bodor

1st Lt. R. A. Gleue
2nd Lt. H. W. Weingartner

IPW TEAM NO. 118

S/Sgt. P. M. Forchheimer
T/Sgt. S. J. Horwitz

Tec. 4 J. M. Kikkert
Tec. 5 W. Becker

1st Lt. E. P. Mahlgut
2nd Lt. R. Rosenstadt

IPW TEAM NO. 119

S/Sgt. C. L. Mosler
Tec. 3 I. Marx

Pfc. Max Klibanoff
Pvt. W. Strauss

Captain S. Schwartz
1st Lt. P. A. Brauth

PI TEAM NO. 57

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S/Sgt. J. W. Cross

Tec. 3 N. P. Hemming
Tec. 3 Lars Slette

Captain E. A. Fischetti
1st Lt. William A. Watkins

PI TEAM NO. 72

M/Sgt. Z. L. Gall
S/Sgt. D. B. Kinstler

Tec. 3 F. G. Pavlica
Tec. 3 W. H. Thurston

Captain E. J. Spillane
1st Lt. A. J. Weber

PI TEAM NO. 84

M/Sgt. W. M. Robson
S/Sgt. S. M. Pollock

Tec. 3 Don Benton
Tec. 3 H. S. Horwitz

AMERICAN RED CROSS

Field Director, John R. Brady
Ass't Field Director, Edward J. Miller

Mrs. Effie H. Hazlett
Miss Eileen O'Leary

ARC Clubmobile Section I, Unit No. 20

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Lt. Col. Ralph K. Johnson
Lt. Col. Robert H. Van Volkenburgh
Lt. Col. Hampton D. Williams, Jr.
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Major Jesse U. Overall
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Captain Anthony Silvestri
Captain Gerald W. Zuck
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1st Lt. Jack L. Warner
2nd Lt. Leland R. Cantlebery

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Jules King

STAFF SERGEANTS

Robert D. Coker
Henry B. Toney

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Severiano F. Naranjo

SERGEANTS

Ray M. Johnson
Jerry C. Sims

TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE

Erwin E. Shultz
Jackson S. Williams

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Frank Vida

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Karl P. Wendt
John B. Anderson

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Edward R. Hoerner
Raymond J. Nelson
John H. Robinson
Laurel R. Schmitz
Robert S. Straith
Milo Zarybnicky

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1st Lt. Robert S. Barger

1st Lt. Gerald S. Williams

CWO Hughlen Huff
1st Sgt. Kenneth J. Buffo

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

John T. Lutz

STAFF SERGEANTS

John Cordova, Jr.
John D. Hebenheimer
James T. Huston
Jerome E. Schaubach
Henry O. Scheunemann
Melvin J. Schutz

TECHNICIAN 3RD GRADE

Richard Flower

TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE

Edwin A. Greatrake
Kenneth W. Lewis
Leslie D. Vail
Robroy Walters
Vernie L. Wilson

CORPORALS

Doc E. Antle
Adolph A. Campiti
George O. Hulse
Melbourne W. Marwede
Stanley C. North
Henry Seder

TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE

Melvin L. Boyer
J. R. Darnell
Alvin P. Henry
Russell J. Hurley
Merle K. Hutton
Albert P. Manno
George A. Marris
Eugene F. McAdams
Alvin B. Miller
John W. Mulherin
Rubert E. Nichter
William H. Roan
Charles B. Rodgers
Menno J. Schmucker
Ike J. Sikorski
Dennie E. Templeton, Jr.
William Thompson
Ivan D. Vulgamore
Kenneth G. Wagner
Hoyl B. Williams

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Richard L. Conklin
Claud W. Corcoran
Raymond W. Cornette

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

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Clyde V. Decker
Floyd R. Fritz
Ralph D. Heath
William F. Heinlein, Jr.
Ruckman H. Hodge
Bernardino V. Magana
Bronislaw A. Maskulinski
Jack P. Mills
Wilbur E. Moran
Peter Olesky
Harry A. Payne
Irving Price
Kenneth A. Reeves
Bernard R. Smith
Keith D. Taylor
Clarence W. Thor
Kenneth J. Vestal
Henry Wagner
Charles A. Wilson

PRIVATE

Harvey R. Clark
Steve Fedico
John B. Kahoun
Murray Lashower
Eugene F. Swanson

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1st Lt. Ray W. Fellows

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS
Marvin M. Pierce
Robert L. Skaggs

STAFF SERGEANTS
Raymond Asbury
John F. Chlilansky
Fred Cook
Christ J. Dietrich
Louis Glassman
Marvin R. Jones
Noah L. Lanier
Stanley A. Moskolonos
Ernest F. Schmidt
Otto J. Stefanski

SERGEANTS
Harold K. Dean
Andrew M. Fischer
Chester Grodski
John P. Lockwood

TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE
Ronald F. Brown
Francis J. Burtshell
Jack Crites
Harold Greenlaw
John Janieski
Louis N. Kaplan
Chew A. Leung
Lauri W. Nykanon
Ernest A. Pelokuin
A. L. Wilson

CORPORALS
Keith K. Hamblin
James A. Rolleston, Jr.
Alfred Stoops
Louis Terruso
Edward M. Witt

TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE
Robert B. Cromer
Lester J. Culver
Edward C. Dral
James H. Fenton
Mervin L. Fisher
Edward S. Furst
Joseph A. Gilson
Herbert R. Gray
Kenneth L. Hass
James R. Hardin
Lewis S. Harvey
Victor O. Harwell
Dale L. Helton

1st Lt. Herman Scott

James H. Henderson
Cecil H. Henry
George A. Kohout
Joseph A. Kuch
William L. Scruntine

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

David H. Argust
Elvin R. Baker
Walter J. Baker
Nolan Barnett
Charles J. Boyd
Kenneth A. Bradley
William V. Brant
Robert Bruns
Emilio B. Cardoza
Robert S. Crawley
T. A. Creswell
David W. Delaney
James H. English
Dale K. Ethridge
Glen T. Fleming
Samuel A. Gangwisch
Hugo E. Grosse
Leland C. Harshman
Lloyd M. Hassler
Russell W. Hetrick
James O. Hibbs
Thomas E. Hickey
James E. Hill
Edwin F. Horan
Joseph P. Huber
Robert Kral
Donald G. Kilbourn
Leo J. Kostkowski
Peter E. Landschoot
Tommy Lee
Arthur Libenson
Garry Linden
Cobern F. Locey
Harold F. Lomas
Lawrence L. Lynch
Charles E. Mann
James J. Majestic
Charles W. McKenzie
Thomas C. Nance
William J. Nesbitt
Jean Nouqueret
Carlo J. Oliva
Fred T. Percey, Jr.
Travis Reppond
Durward L. Rinaca
Elmer L. Robinson

1st Lt. Alvin S. Siff
1st Sgt. Edward F. Crider

George J. Rosensteel
Clifford J. Rosner
Lee C. Sassaman
August J. Schiffgens
Peter Simko
Wilson Sitten
Paul L. Smith
Leo Sobajie
Robert E. Stein
Garland J. Stone
John D. Trabasso
Walter T. Travis
Noel F. West
John P. Williams
Maynard P. White

PRIVATES

Carroll C. Albus
Anthony S. Barlotta
Austin E. Bush
Joseph Caca
Walter L. Coleman
Eugene V. Crawford
Charles Dietz
Felix V. Duenez
Louis D. Epperson
Dominic T. Fuca
Frank E. Gallardo
Victor F. Gardner
Philip F. Greubal
Francis L. Gummoe
Arthur T. Hughes
Roy A. Inge
Joseph A. Iocco
Lawrence W. Kissell
Martin J. Kutina
Raymond F. Leppert
William H. Long
Joseph F. Martin
Michael J. McGrath
Walter D. Miller
Victor V. Misilewich
Conrad A. Olson
Gamewell Page
Roma W. Payne
John F. Peters
Edward F. Polchlopek
George Sachs
LeRoy E. Schrader
Preston C. Sharpe
Robert F. Tempkins, Jr.
Walter L. Wallace
Robert Wright

MEDICAL DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS COMPANY III CORPS

Captain Harry Rhodes, Jr.
Captain Adolph G. Goehring, Jr.
S/Sgt. Herman Knell

Cpl. Paul M. Shaffer
Tec. 5 Robert P. Address
Tec. 5 Claude C. Cowan, Jr.
Tec. 5 Kenneth M. Namtvedt

Pfc. Clarence E. Cunningham, Jr.
Joseph W. Hytha
Pvt. R. Lloyd

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON III CORPS

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON III CORPS

Major Richard E. Barrett
1st Lt. Norman J. Romaguera
1st Lt. Madison Tinsley

MASTER SERGEANT
James A. Burgess

STAFF SERGEANTS
Franklin C. Jacobs
William Van Thomas

SERGEANTS
William K. Bast
William A. Brinkman
Charles E. Carlin
Carl V. Eibel
Nickolas Miller
Francis J. Roelke

TECHNICIAN 4TH GRADE
Joseph W. Trzesinski

CORPORALS
Paul E. Grenon
Peter L. Kolarik
Robert B. Potter
Rudolph L. Torbeck
Frank E. Winkler

TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE
Leo A. Lasater
Leonard J. LaBelle
Francis J. Nelson
Vernon E. Romph
George J. Silva
Carlton B. White

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS
Wayne Anderson
Eugene M. Antila
Jack Armstrong

Wayne V. Barnes
Carl E. Bengston
Ralph E. Bittner
Wendall L. Black
John E. Cadotte
Carmine W. Cammerata
Sidney Canton
Robert G. Currier
Joseph T. Daley
Fred Doviki
Frederick L. Eldridge
Ralph D. Eppley
Clifford X. Faccone
Melville M. Ferdon
Anthony R. Fernandez
William H. Gantt
Joseph W. Greer
Jerry C. Hrbek
Columbus W. Johnson
Bernard W. Langtry
Norman V. Lees
Alfred E. Mazanek
Willard R. McCully
Morris McDonald
Joseph T. Mesler
Raymond G. Metcalf
Paul P. Meyer
Edwin D. Mitchell
Richard E. Mormann
William E. Moses
George Mucha
Herman Nathanson
John Nemecek
Hubert H. Owens
Floyd D. Penrod
John A. Perrotta
John A. Pessalano
Frederick L. Plass
Walter A. Reinhart
Bevo B. Rigan, Jr.

Ray Robertson
Cawn W. Sheets
Alvis C. Smith
James D. Smith
William K. Smith
Arthur A. Sommerfeld
James L. Speaks
Harold W. Stamm
Jack W. Starnes
Gordon E. Teal
Ernest Trawick
Norman E. Van Ness
Andrew L. Varga
Robert W. Vivian
Gordon B. Young

PRIVATE S
Sam Barron
Eugene L. Boisselle
Gerald L. Butzine
Joseph Cartwright, Jr.
Roy V. Clark
Ernest Constantine
Robert E. Dickinson
Chester J. Gorcowski
LeRoy C. Hall
Archie K. Higgins
Robert W. Koehn
Archie F. Lindquist
Martin Miller
Harleth L. Munt
John D. Oliver
Edwin F. Plotts
Joseph Pollach
Virgil Runyon
David S. Scishman
William H. Thorn
Phillip D. Thron
Emile J. Vautrinot
Charles J. Washburn

III Corps Troop List --- VE Day

4th Infantry Division
377th AAA AW Bn
610th TD Bn
70th Tank Bn
300th Engr C Bn

99th Infantry Division
535th AAA AW Bn
629th TD Bn
786th Tank Bn
291st Engr C Bn
3rd Plat, 42nd Field Hosp

9th Armored Division
482nd AAA AW Bn
656th TD Bn
3458th QM Trk Co
3600th QM Trk Co
299th Engr C Bn
2nd Plat, 59th Field Hosp

14th Armored Division
398th AAA AW Bn
395th QM Trk Co
4380th QM Trk Co

14th Cavalry Group
18th Cavalry Ren Sq
32nd Cavalry Ren Sq

III Corps Artillery
211th FA Gp
240th FA Bn
667th FA Bn
809th FA Bn
288th FA Obsn Bn

401st FA Gp
254th FA Bn
264th FA Bn
281st FA Bn
290th FA Obsn Bn

408th FA Gp
170th FA Bn
400th Armd FA Bn
528th FA Bn
742nd FA Bn
762nd FA Bn

38th AAA Brig, Hq/Hq Btry
7th AAA Gp
115th AAA Gun Bn
129th AAA Gun Bn
16th AAA Gp
457th AAA AW Bn
565th AAA AW Bn
634th AAA AW Bn

90th Chemical Bn (4.2)
95th Chemical Bn (4.2)
162nd Cml SG Co
672nd Engr Topo Co
2942nd Engr TIT
974th Engr Maint Co
1st Plat, Co A, 602nd Engr Cam Bn
1111th Engr C Gp
51st Engr C Bn
525th Engr L Pon Co
629th Engr LE Co
998th Engr Trdwy Br Co

1123rd Engr C Gp
145th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
678th Engr LE Co

1159th Engr C Gp
254th Engr C Bn
1262nd Engr C Bn
72nd Engr L Pon Co
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co

187th Medical Bn
439th Med Coll Co
484th Med Coll Co

821st MP Co (Corps)
2nd Plat, 23rd QM Car Co
447th QM Trk Co
3403rd QM Trk Co
3259th Sig Serv Co

94th Sig Bn (Corps)
239th Sig Radar Maint Unit
Det "YI" 21st Wea Sq, 40 CS

8th TD Group
648th TD Bn

Composite Service Co, III Corps
3rd Spec Serv Co (2nd Plat)
38th Fin Disb Sec
92nd Fin Disb Sec
48th MRU
202nd APU

Coming Home



Corps CP at Erlangen, Germany
Camp "Twenty Grand."
Rolling along the Seine towards Le Havre.

Leaving Erlangen—first step towards home.
Loaded up at "Twenty Grand."
Waiting to go aboard.



*Landing craft takes troops to ship.
 Loading aboard ship.
 Navy blimp sails overhead.*

*About to board USS "Wakefield."
 Boston welcomes us HOME.
 Jam session aboard ship.*

III Corps Proud Of '66 Deeds

THE III Corps Artillery is proud of its accomplishments during 1966. The diversity of missions was a challenge to all concerned — but the command came through with flying colors.

Training on all aspects of the Sergeant and Pershing missiles is a complex operation in itself, but additional missions of training TRAPPs, REPs, BCTs and packets from the Federal Republic of Germany may have added a few grey hairs to the commanders and cadremen.

In February the 7th of the 8th had 999 men assigned to it for Basic Combat Training. The program was highly successful and in April all units and activities of the Corps passed the annual IG inspection.

IN MAY, the 1st Artillery Brigade was merged with III Corps Artillery which ultimately resulted in the Corps moving from Building 2599 to Buildings 1611 and 1612 — the current location.

July 31, Brig. Gen. John D. Torrey Jr. retired from command and the present commander, Colonel John W. Dean Jr. assumed command 1 August. On 17 August Col. Nelson W. Tobey, former commander of the 9th Missile Group became Deputy Commander of the Corps.

Colonel John S. Erwin became Executive Officer of III Corps Artillery on 16 September, replacing Colonel H. E. Bielefeld who was assigned to the office of ACoS, G3.

1966 WAS an outstanding year for training activities, and the schedule included considerable traveling for several units. Training missile shoots were engaged in by the 3rd of the 38th (Sergeant Missile), 2nd of the 79th (Pershing), and the 2nd of the 44th (PSG).

The 2-79 Arty had units training at White Sands, NM., as early as 11 January. The 1st of June saw units from 2-79 training at Gibson, Utah, and in November Blanding, Utah, was utilized as the training site for a battalion test.

Units of the 3-38 trained at White Sands from 31 May to 10 June. A battalion test was conducted at White Sands from 28 Nov. to 9 Dec.



UNITS FROM the 2-44 trained from 1 June to 3 August at Blanding and Gibson, Utah.

A substantial increase in the number of TRAPP personnel trained by III Corps Artillery found more than 4,000 being trained in almost every unit of the Corps.

The 2-79 Arty trained the 21st German Packet, FRG, and the 2-44 Arty trained the 22nd German Packet, FRG. The 3-38 Arty trained two Sergeant Packets for Korea.

The III Corps Artillery trained 1227 REPs and 707 BCTs. The 1-18 Artillery and the 3-25 were instrumental in much of this training.

Units which were activated or reorganized for school troop support or deployment to Vietnam were the 2nd Field Force, 6-14 Arty, 2-32 Arty, 2-17 Arty, 2-13 Arty, 2-94 Arty, 1-40 Arty, 1-83 Arty, C-6-16 Arty, and the 484th Radar Detachment.






III CORPS
 REFERENCE


- RED - ENEMY ACTION
- BLUE - RIVERS, LAKES, ETC
- BLACK - BORDERS, CORPS BOUNDARIES, AND DIVISIONAL LINES OF ADVANCE

THESE ENLARGEMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM SHEET 1 TO SHOW MORE IN DETAIL THE ACTION WHICH TOOK PLACE IN ITS THREE MAJOR PHASES.

SCALE 1:400,000



DRIVE TO AUSTRIAN BORDER




RUHR
POCKET



BATTLE OF THE BULGE

ROER AND RHINE RIVER PHASES AND RUHR POCKET



GERMAN UNITS ORDERED TO HOLD ON THE RIVER. END MAP BY THIRD U.S. ARMY

